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An emerging area of research within economics seeks to better understand contemporary
economic outcomes by taking a historical perspective. This body of work has established that
many of the differences in economic development that we see today have their roots in the
past. A wide range of historical factors from all regions of the world has been demonstrated
to have effects that are felt for decades, centuries, and in some cases even millennia. To better
understand the specific causal mechanisms underlying the relationships between historical and
contemporary factors, recent contributions to the literature have begun to draw from other
disciplines, particularly history, anthropology, and psychology. For example, a number of studies
have shown that historical events can affect the evolution of cultural traits, which are important
determinants of contemporary economic development. While most of these studies have focused
on documenting persistence and the long-term effects of historical shocks on culture, there is
less evidence on the importance of shorter-run historical shocks.
My thesis addresses this gap by examining the role of short-run historical shocks in shaping
individuals’ culture and psychology. Moreover, it explores the importance of a specific cultural
trait, which may have become more prevalent in response to conflict, for economic outcomes.
In three separate chapters, the thesis presents evidence on a number of historical shocks from
different parts of the world. The evidence suggests that cultural change can result from short-
run negative shocks or political incentives among the elites. It also indicates that traditional
beliefs in the existence of supernatural protection are significant enough to affect psychological
well-being, economic decisions, and business growth. In the following, I briefly summarize each
chapter’s research question and main findings.
In Chapter 1, I investigate the effect of negative collective shocks on the importance of con-
formity to social norms. Norm conformity alters people’s publicly displayed behavior, even when
they privately hold different preferences or beliefs. While norm conformity is an integral part of
human psychology, there is huge variation in the extent to which individuals conform to social
norms between societies. According to cultural evolutionary theory, a key determinant is the
experience of negative collective shocks. In this view, evolutionary selection favors psychologi-
cal traits that promote social cohesion in response to shocks, including stronger conformity to
existing social norms. Based on a stylized model, I test this hypothesis by linking occurrences
of natural disasters and major economic downturns to large-scale survey data from around the
world. The evidence shows that individuals who have experienced negative shocks place more
importance in norm conformity today. Conversely, people who have lived through periods of
higher economic growth put less emphasis on norm conformity.
In Chapter 2, which is joint work with Sebastian Ottinger, we study the effect of political
threat on the spread of racial propaganda in the media in the late 19th century U.S. South. Racial
inequality and racism are key determinants of contermporary poverty in the United States.
Moreover, the literature has recently established that slavery and Jim Crow have persistent
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effects that continue to be felt today. Building on these findings, we examine the case of the
unexpected and short-lived electoral success of the pro-redistribution Populist Party in the
1892 presidential elections. The Populists sought support among poor farmers, regardless of
race. This biracial alliance threatened the Democratic establishment in the South, providing it
with an incentive to fan racial fears to split the newly formed coalition. Newspapers affiliated
with the Democrats spread propaganda of attacks by Blacks on the White community, often
involving allegations of rape. Using novel newspaper data, we identify these hate stories and
show that they become more prevalent in the years following the 1892 presidential election in
counties where the Populists were active. The effect is large and found in newspapers affiliated
with the Democrats only. The evidence also suggests that the propaganda “worked”: where
newspapers spread more propaganda, the Democrats see stronger gains in presidential elections
in the following decades, long after the Populists left the political arena.
Finally, in Chapter 3, which is joint work with Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, we examine the
economic effects of anti-theft protection spells on the economic decisions of beer retailers in
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Such beliefs are present in all strata of society
and have become more widely used with the rise in conflict in the region in recent decades. In
this environment, retailers often experience theft, and expectations of theft lead retailers to lose
business due to anxiety and frequent stock-outs. We extend access to retailers to undergo the
rituals of three regional reputed witch doctors, and randomize the timing of the rituals. For
retailers who report believing that the spell worked, the ritual reduces reported stress and the
perceived risk of theft. Furthermore, as a result of the ritual, they purchased more bottles of
beer, resulting in higher inventories and fewer stock-outs for weeks after the treatment, which
increased sales and profits. None of these effects are found for retailers that did not believe in




1 Shocks and Norm Conformity 1
1.1 Introduction
Across societies, individuals want their behavior to match social norms, the shared behavioral
standards of their communities. This desire for conformity alters people’s publicly displayed
behavior, even when they privately hold different preferences or beliefs. While a vast amount of
experimental work, beginning with Asch’s (1951) famous studies, show that norm conformity is
an integral part of human psychology, recent work in cross-cultural psychology documents that
norm conformity is more prevalent in some countries than in others (Gelfand et al., 2011). This
difference confers an important trade-off to societies. On the one hand, by restricting the scope
of acceptable behaviors, norm conformity promotes homogeneity and social cohesion, which
facilitates collective action and reaching agreements in public policy; on the other hand, a lesser
emphasis on norm conformity is conducive to diversity in behavior, attitudes, and beliefs, which
may benefit creative innovation and long-run economic growth. Given the evidence, the question
arises: Why is conformity to social norms in some societies more prevalent than in others? In
particular, what leads some individuals to place greater importance in norm conformity than
others?
According to scholars in psychology, anthropology, and evolutionary biology, the answer is
that the extent to which societies assign importance to norm conformity has evolved as a function
of external threat (e.g., Roos et al., 2015). The more individuals have been exposed to negative
shocks that threaten their society’s survival, the more they emphasize norm conformity today.
To see how shocks can be an important determinant of norm conformity, consider a population
confronting a series of social dilemmas, where cooperation produces the socially efficient outcome,
but defecting is the individually rational strategy. Social norms often prescribe cooperation and
punishment of defectors in such contexts. If a shock hits the population, then conformity to
social norms becomes particularly beneficial because it promotes collective action and, therefore,
increases the chances of survival. For example, societies that highly depend on agriculture for
their survival live well when crops are plenty but suffer when there is a lasting drought. These
societies increase their chances of survival if everyone follows the rules around crop cultivation
and water consumption in times of need. More generally, this logic suggests that the more
societies are exposed to negative collective shocks, the more beneficial it is to conform to the
existing social norms.
I begin my analysis by providing a simple model that illustrates this logic. In it, individuals
enter a prisoner’s dilemma whose payoffs are determined by the economic condition in each
period. Specifically, if a negative shock occurs, it uniformly reduces everyone’s material payoff,
possibly to subsistence consumption levels, in that period. Individuals may choose to invest in
norm conformity, which promotes cooperation by imposing a cost on others who defect. The
1 This chapter should be cited as Winkler, Max (2020): “Shocks and Norm Conformity”, Mimeo.
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model predicts that it is relatively more attractive for individuals to value norm conformity, the
more the shock reduces their payoff toward the subsistence minimum. Hence, the logic suggests
that a negative collective shock causes a society to place greater importance in norm conformity.
I take this hypothesis to the data and test for a relationship between individuals’ experience
of a variety of short-run negative shocks and the extent to which they value norm conformity.
To measure the importance of norm conformity, I use a question that is included in two waves of
the World Values Surveys (WVS). The WVS is a collection of nationally representative surveys
on people’s attitudes and values, covering roughly 100 countries, and also containing information
on demographic characteristics, including year of birth and country of current residence.
To examine whether short-run shocks affect the importance people assign to norm conformity,
I compile data on the occurrences of several forms of shocks, including three different types of
natural disasters and major economic downturns. First, I use drought data from the CRU TS
v.4.01 data set, which contains gridded measures of the self-calibrating Palmer Drought Severity
Index (scPDSI). The data set is constructed from weather stations around the world, has a
very find geographic resolution (Schrier et al., 2013). Second, I employ earthquake data come
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which provides geocoded
information about earthquakes that were significant enough to create moderate damage or cause
the loss of life. Third, I draw on hurricane data compiled by Yang (2008) and Mahajan and Yang
(2020), who have constructed a “hurricane index” based on meteorological data on storm paths
and intensities. Fourth, Barro and Ursúa (2008) assembled a data set of economic disasters in
the form of large drops in national consumption.
I use an empirical strategy that is to estimate the relationship between individuals’ lifetime
experience of shocks and their emphasis on norm conformity. The lifetime experience measures
account for experiences accumulated during an individuals’ prior lifetime and allow for experience
effects to decay over time, e.g., as memory fades or structural change renders early experiences
less relevant. To construct these measures, I merge the occurrences of the four different types
of shocks to the survey data based on respondents’ birth year and country of residence. The
empirical strategy exploits variation in exposure to these shocks over people’s lifetime. I estimate
a difference-in-differences model to examine the effect of shock experiences on the importance
people place in norm conformity. Identification comes from cross-sectional differences in views on
the importance of norm conformity and shock histories and from changes of those cross-sectional
differences over time. All estimations include fixed effects that control for country of current
residence × survey year, age, and birth year. Country of current residence × survey year fixed
effects remove country-specific determinants of norm conformity and allow these determinants
to change over the years of the survey data collection. Age fixed effects remove life cycle effects,
such as age-related increases in importance of norm conformity. Birth year fixed effects remove
effects specific to cohorts. By using within-country variation across cohorts, I exploit occurrences
of shocks that are arguable uncorrelated with other determinants of the value placed on norm
conformity. Any estimated difference in the importance of norm conformity should, therefore,
capture the causal effect of shock-induced negative shocks.
I find positive and statistically significant relationships between the experience of negative
shocks and the importance placed in norm conformity. Individuals who have lived through more
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severe drought conditions, significant earthquakes, hurricanes, or economic downturns put a
stronger emphasis on norm conformity. The estimates indicate that a one standard deviation
increase in the shock experience is associated with roughly 4-9% of a standard deviation increase
in the importance of norm conformity. These effect sizes are substantial. They correspond to
ca. 3-8% of the gap between the average emphasis of norm conformity in the Netherlands and
Egypt, which are among the countries with the lowest and highest emphasis on norm conformity
in the data.
I perform several robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of the results. First, I add
controls for individuals’ educational attainment and employment status. All results go through
if I account for these additional (more endogenous) covariates. Second, I rerun the regressions
restricting the sample to native-born individuals. In the main analysis, I use the country where
the survey was conducted to determine the respondents’ residences during their whole lifetime.
This procedure raises two concerns: (i) selective migration could drive the result if, for example,
individuals who place little importance in norm conformity migrate from countries with frequent
shocks to countries with fewer shocks; and (ii) the method may introduce measurement error
among those individuals who recently immigrated to their current country of residence. To
address this concern, I restrict the sample to native-born individuals. Excluding immigrants
from the sample leads to qualitatively similar results, although a substantially smaller sample
size implies that not all coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels. Third, I test
the influence of single countries and cohorts on the estimates. I rerun the main specifications
several times, each time excluding one country or one cohort. Again, I obtain very similar
estimates.
In the final exercise, I extend the logic of the model by examining the relationship between
positive economic conditions and the importance of norm conformity. I compute individuals’
lifetime experience of consumption growth rates and test whether individuals who have expe-
rienced higher growth rates in their prior lifetime place less importance in norm conformity
today. I find a negative and statistically significant relationship. The estimates indicate that
a one standard deviation increase in consumption growth experience is associated with roughly
5% of a standard deviation decrease in the importance of norm conformity. As before, the effect
size is substantial. It corresponds to ca. 4-5% of the gap between the Netherlands and Egypt.
In sum, the empirical analyses yield a coherent conclusion. Be it in the form of natural
disasters or major economic downturns, the experience of negative shocks increases the impor-
tance people place in conformity to the existing social norms. Conversely, people who have lived
through periods of high economic growth put less emphasis on norm conformity.
My findings contribute to several strands of the literature. First, they add to a growing
body of work that empirically investigates the determinants of cultural traits and norms (Nunn
and Wantchekon, 2011; Alesina et al., 2013; Guiso et al., 2016; Becker et al., 2016; Buggle and
Durante, 2017; Lowes et al., 2017; Becker, 2019; Enke, 2019; Schulz et al., 2019; Giuliano and
Nunn, 2020). The literature has established that today’s differences in norms and cultural traits
are determined through an evolutionary process, and that they matter for economic develop-
ment. However, these differences are small when compared to variability in cultural traits within
societies (Desmet et al., 2017). By studying differences in norm conformity, a “meta trait” that
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abstracts from any particular norm or cultural trait but regulates the heterogeneity of culture in
society, this paper provides a rationale for why some societies are more culturally diverse than
others.
Second, my paper ties into recent work that studies the rise in cultural polarization in recent
decades (Bertrand and Kamenica, 2018; Desmet and Wacziarg, 2020). Since norm conformity
entails cultural homogeneity within groups, it may result in a cultural divide between groups
if they conform to different norms. While these studies treat the extent of norm conformity as
an exogenous parameter, my paper provides an explanation for why societies become culturally
more polarized. This also relates to a broader literature, originating in political science and
sociology, that examines cultural change arising from modernization and economic prosperity
(Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 2000) and cultural backlash and political polarization as
a consequence of economic insecurity and inequality (Autor et al., 2016; Inglehart, 2018; Fetzer,
2019; Bo et al., 2019).
Third, a growing amount of experimental work suggests that short-run shocks can lead to
cultural change. These papers have mainly focused on conflict between groups. They show that
individuals who were exposed to conflict behave more cooperatively toward their group members
in behavioral experiments (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Gneezy and Fessler, 2012; Voors et al.,
2012; Cassar et al., 2013; Bauer et al., 2014; Gilligan et al., 2014; Bauer et al., 2016; Lowes and
Montero, 2018), and that religiosity may be a proximate mechanism (Henrich et al., 2019). This
paper suggests another proximate mechanism: stronger conformity to prosocial norms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out a stylized
model of the evolution of norm conformity as a function of collective negative shocks. The
model shows how a strong emphasis on norm conformity is a cultural adaption to a history
of negative shocks. Section 1.3 describes the data used in the analysis and the measurement
of lifetime shock experiences. Section 1.4 presents the strategy of the empirical analysis and
reports the results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
This section lays out a conceptual framework for how negative collective shocks may affect the
importance of norm conformity in society. I present a purposefully simple and stylized model
to structure and motivate the empirical analysis. The insight that emerges from the model is
that it is relatively more beneficial to value norm conformity (and comply with the norms) in
response to negative shocks. Intuitively, this is because norm conformity facilitates collective
action, enabling any society to operate more efficiently. These efficiency gains are particularly
valuable when coping with the consequences of negative shocks. This mechanism is akin to
several models on the origins of large-scale cooperation and its evolution (e.g. Andrés Guzmán
et al., 2007; Boyd et al., 2011; Roos et al., 2015).
Setup. The players of the game consist of a continuum of members of a society. Time is
discrete, and players live forever. In each period, players enter a prisoner’s dilemma with a
random other player, where they choose to either cooperate (C) or defect (D), ai ∈ {C, D}. The
material payoffs in each period are summarized in Table 1.1. Here, t > r > p > s are standard
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prisoner’s dilemma parameters. In addition, material payoffs include a loss which depends on
the realization of the shock random variable, ∆t ∈ [0, δ], where δ < 1. If a shock occurs, it
uniformly reduces material payoffs by a fraction of δ. For example, a drought destroys half of
the crops, independent of the actions individuals adopt. Finally, each player needs a minimum
payoff to survive, µ ∈ (0, s − δs), which is positive, but smaller than the lowest possible material
payoff to avoid negative payoffs. The subsistence payoff is subtracted from all payoffs. Denote
player i’s net material payoffs from the prisoner’s dilemma by yi.
Table 1.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
C(ooperate) / T(ight) D(efect) / L(oose)
C(ooperate) / T(ight) r − ∆tr − µ, r − ∆tr − µ s − ∆ts − µ, t − ∆tt − µ
D(efect) / L(oose) t − ∆tt − µ, s − ∆ts − µ p − ∆tp − µ, p − ∆tp − µ
Notes: t > r > p > s are standard prisoner’s dilemma parameters. ∆t ∈ [0, δ] is the shock
random variable, where δ < 1. It is positive in period t with some small probability. If a
shock occurs, it uniformly destroys material payoffs by a fraction of δ. µ ∈ (0, s − δs) is the
minimum level of consumption players need to survive.
Apart from caring about their material payoff, players potentially bear a cost if they deviate
from the social norms. I assume that cooperating is the social norm in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Hence, players may face a cost if they choose to defect. This cost depends on γ, the severity of
social disapproval or punishment of norm violators.
At several points throughout their lives, players choose one of two possible strategies. The
first strategy values norm conformity and places strong importance on avoiding behaviors that
others consider wrong. I call players who choose this strategy "tight (T)". Tight players never
deviate from the social norm and, therefore, always cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma. How-
ever, there is a cost to adopting and maintaining the tight strategy in each period. This cost
arises because tight players, to avoid behaviors that others consider wrong, cannot always choose
the behaviors that they prefer the most. The cost is proportional to players’ material payoffs,
κyi, where κ > 0.
2 The second strategy does not value norm conformity and places no impor-
tance in avoiding behaviors that others consider wrong. I call players who choose that strategy
"loose (L)". Loose players always defect in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Players’ strategy choices are persistent. While players interact with a randomly chosen other
player each period, they can only occasionally revise their strategy. More precisely, each player
maintains her strategy for T periods, where T is an independent draw from an exponential
distribution with rate R. When a player has the opportunity to revise her strategy, she follows a
simple rule: she compares her current payoff with those from a random sample of other members
in society and, with probability proportional to the difference in payoffs, switches her strategy
2More precisely, κ ∈ (0, (r + γ − t)/(r − µ)) where (r + γ − t)/(r − µ) < 1. If κ > (r + γ − t)/(r − µ), then
the cost is prohibitively high and no one will adopt and maintain the tight strategy. I focus on the empirically
relevant case where both strategies are present in the population. The condition also implies upper and lower
bounds for γ, i.e., t − r + κ(r − µ) < γ < t − µ. If γ did not meet this condition, then again only one of two
strategies were present in the population.
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if the other strategy yields a higher payoff.
In each period, a shock may or may not hit society. If it occurs, a shock affects the relative
attractiveness of the two strategies by increasing the relative benefit of cooperation in the pris-
oner’s dilemma. Since players can revise their strategies only occasionally, the effect of shocks
on the distribution of strategies adopted in society will persist over several periods.
Expected payoffs. I now turn to an examination of the expected payoffs of both strategies.
Let πst denote the expected payoff from choosing the tight (s = T ) or the loose (s = L) strategy
in period t. Given the random matching process, the average payoffs are a function of the
players interacting with each other and the share of tight players in the population. I let
α ∈ [0, 1] denote this share and interpret α as the measure of the overall importance of norm
conformity in the society. I first consider the expected payoff of the tight strategy. Tight players
receive the expected material payoff from the prisoner’s dilemma and bear the cost of valuing
norm conformity and avoiding behaviors that others consider wrong. In the prisoner’s dilemma,
they benefit from a cooperative interaction and receive r if matched with another tight player.
However, they risk receiving the sucker’s payoff s if matched with a loose player. If a shock hits,
it reduces all material payoffs by a fraction of ∆t. The subsistence payoff µ is subtracted, and
the cost of valuing norm conformity κ is a fraction of the remaining material payoff. Thus, the
expected payoff for the tight strategy is given by:
Tight strategy (norm adherers): πTt = (1 − κ)
︸ ︷︷ ︸


















Loose players, receive the expected material payoff from the prisoner’s dilemma, and face
the punishment cost for deviating from the social norm γ if they defect in an interaction with
a tight player. In the prisoner’s dilemma, they gain the temptation payoff t if matched with a
tight player. They receive p if matched with another loose player. Again, a shock cuts material
payoffs by a fraction of ∆t – including the punishment cos γ – and the subsistence payoff µ is
subtracted. Thus, the expected payoff for the loose strategy is given by:


















Shocks and importance of norm conformity. The evolution of the importance placed in
norm conformity is captured by the growth rate of adoption of the tight strategy, which equals
the standard replicator dynamic (Sandholm, 2010). Intuitively, the strategy with the higher
expected payoff propagates faster, and the dominated strategy is progressively eliminated. Let






= α(πT − π)
= α(πT − (απT + (1 − α)πL))
= α(1 − α)(πT − πL)







− (1 − ∆t)(y
L − yT )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
relative loss from not










= β0 + β1∆t
(1.3)
where β0 = α(1 − α)(αγ + κµ − α(t + κr − r) − (1 − α)(p + κs − s)) < 0, and β1 = α(1 − α)(α(t +
κr − r) + (1 − α)(p + κs − s) − αγ) > 0.
Thus, a negative shock has a positive effect on the growth rate of the importance placed in
norm conformity in society. Since players can revise their strategies only occasionally, the effects
of shocks persist for several periods. This generates the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. The more individuals have experienced negative collective shocks in their prior
life, the more they place importance in conformity to social norms today.
In sum, the model presented here shows how negative collective shocks ∆t result in greater
importance placed in norm conformity α. I now turn to the data description and empirical
analysis, which tests the hypothesis.
1.3 Data and Measurement
My difference-in-differences empirical strategy compares the importance placed on norm con-
formity of individuals who experienced different degrees of collective negative shocks across
countries. This empirical strategy requires measurement of individuals’ emphasis on norm con-
formity and their shock experience.
1.3.1 Dependent Variable: Importance of Norm Conformity
To measure the importance people place on norm conformity, I use a question from the World
Values Surveys (WVS), a data set that consists of a series of nationally representative surveys
covering roughly 100 countries from around the world. It contains information on different
types of attitudes, values, and preferences, as well as information on standard demographic
characteristics, such as sex, age, education, and labor market status. In two survey waves
during the years 2006-2009 and 2010-2014, respondents are given the description of a person:
It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would
say is wrong. Respondents then choose the answer that best describes how similar this person
is to them: very much like me; like me; somewhat like me; a little like me; not like me; and not
at all like me. I code the responses to create a variable with integer values from 16, increasing
with the value placed on proper behavior (or norm conformity).
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1.3.2 Independent Variables: Lifetime Shock Experiences
Individuals may experience many different types of negative shocks. Among the most impor-
tant sources of negative shocks in humans’ history were wars, natural disasters, diseases, and
famines. To test the hypothesis that collective negative shocks increase the importance of norm
conformity, I collect data on natural disasters and major economic downturns. I focus on these
shocks for several reasons. First, they are easy to measure and comparable across countries and
over time. Among the various types of natural disasters, droughts, earthquakes, and hurricanes
(or tropical storms more generally) were most devastating in recent decades (Ritchie, 2014).
Second, different natural disasters typically affect different parts of the world. For example,
certain countries frequently suffer from earthquakes but never see a hurricane, and vice versa.
Third, the strategy has the key advantage that it reduces the likelihood that unobserved char-
acteristics specific to a particular shock drive the results or that any individual result is a false
positive. Fourth, natural disasters have the appealing feature that they are clearly exogenous.
Droughts. The drought data come in the form of the self-calibrating Palmer Drought Severity
Index (scPDSI) provided by the Climatic Research Unit.3 The CRU TS v.4.01 data set contains
gridded measures for the scPDSI at monthly frequency for the whole world at a 0.5-degree
resolution (approx. 55km). The data set is constructed from weather stations around the world
and available from 1901 (Schrier et al., 2013).
I use geospatial software to aggregate the gridded drought data to the country-year level.
Following standard procedures (e.g., Dell et al., 2012), I compute population-weighted average
drought conditions for each country and year, where the weights are constructed from 2000
population data at 0.5-degrees resolution from the Global rural-urban Mapping project (Balk
et al., 2006). I multiply the scPDSI values by minus so that higher numbers indicate more
severe drought conditions. The resulting data set contains yearly average drought intensity
measures for countries covered by the WVS since 1902. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the data
for the countries included in the analysis. According to the PDSI definition, values greater than
2 indicate moderate drought conditions on average in a given country and year.
Earthquakes. The earthquake data come from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA). It provides a geocoded data set that records information about each
earthquake if it was significant enough to create moderate damage or cause the loss of life. An
earthquake is classified as significant in the database if it meets one of the following criteria:
Moderate damage (approximately $1 million or more), ten or more deaths, Magnitude 7.5 or
greater, Modified Mercalli Intensity Xs or greater, or the earthquake generated a tsunami.
To construct earthquake exposure measures at the country-year level, I proceed as follows.
Starting with the 2000 population gridded data at 0.5-degrees resolution from the Global rural-
urban Mapping project, I assign earthquakes with Richter magnitude of 6 (strong) or greater to
grids if they occurred within a radius of 100km to the grids’ centroids.4 For each grid and year,
3See Palmer (1965) for the origin of the drought severity index and details on its construction.
4These thresholds have been used in the literature before, for example, by Bentzen (2019).
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where eqigt is the Richter magnitude of earthquake i assigned to grid g in year t. eq
max is
the maximum magnitude observed in the data, 9.5 on the Richter scale. A grid’s earthquake
exposure in a given year is then the sum of all xigt in that year, and a country’s exposure is
the population-weighted average of all grid-level values. The resulting data set contains yearly
average earthquake intensity measures for countries included in the WVS since 1850. Appendix
Figure A.2 displays these data.
Hurricanes. The hurricane data come from Yang (2008) and Mahajan and Yang (2020), who
construct a “hurricane index” based on meteorological data on storm paths and intensities.5
The data set provides estimates of the average storm exposure of residents in a given country
and year since 1950. The construction of the index is very similar to the procedure described
for my earthquake exposure measure. The index is highly predictive of disaster damages and
human losses experienced by countries in particular years. Appendix Figure A.3 exhibits these
the index for countries included in the analysis over time.
Economic disasters. Barro and Ursúa (2008) have compiled time-series data on consumption
from 1870 to today for a sample of 42 countries. The authors define periods of economic disasters
when consumption drops by 10% or more from peak to trough. I rely on this definition and
set an indicator equal to one in years when a country goes through a consumption disaster.
Appendix Figure A.4 shows the evolution of this indicator for countries included in the analysis.
Defining lifetime shock experiences. To test whether lifetime shock experiences affect the
importance of norm conformity, I construct measures of past experiences that apply the weight-
ing function estimated in prior work in the context of unemployment experience (Malmendier
and Nagel, 2011; Malmendier and Shen, 2019). Specifically, I measure the shock experience




w(t, k) Shockt−k (1.5)
where Shockt−k is the shock realization in year t − k, and k denotes the time lag. Weights






This weighting specification accounts for all experiences accumulated during an individuals
lifetime. It allows for experience effects to decay over time, e.g., as memory fades or structural
5The term “hurricane” is typically used to describe severe tropical storms in the Atlantic and eastern Pacific.
However, the same type of event is known as a “typhoon” in the western Pacific and “tropical cyclone” in the
Indian Ocean and Oceania. A tropical storm is classed as a hurricane if sustains winds above 74 miles (119
kilometers) per hour.
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change renders old experiences less relevant. Thus, the weighting scheme emphasizes recent
experiences, letting them carry higher weights, while still allowing for an impact of earlier life
histories.
Appendix Figures A.5 to A.8 display the average experiences of droughts, earthquakes, hur-
ricanes, and economic disasters across countries.
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Notes: The figures illustrate how shock experiences map into the independent variables of the analysis.
The top panel shows the economic shock indicator time series for the U.S., Spain, and Argentina; the
bottom-left panel plots the average experiences for each of the three countries; and the bottom-right
panel shows the mean economic shock experiences for young (age below 40), middle-aged (between 41
and 60), and old individuals (above 60) in Spain (left plot) and Argentina (right plot). Economic shock
experiences are computed as described in equations 1.5 and 1.6. The plots highlight the three sources
of variation that are central to the identification strategy. Differences in individuals’ lifetime experiences
depend on their cohort and country of residence, and these evolve. The younger the individuals, the more
important are the most recent shock experiences.
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Illustrating how shocks shape shock experience. To illustrate how shock occurrences
translate into the main independent variables in the analysis, the top panel in Figure 1.1 dis-
plays the economic shock indicator of Barro and Ursúa (2008) for the United States, Spain, and
Argentina. The United States experienced a contraction larger than 10% in national consump-
tion after World War I and during the Great Depression in the 1930s; Spain saw such downturns
frequently during the first half of the 20th century and, most recently, after the financial crisis
of 2008; Argentina experienced large economic shocks throughout the century, most recently
around 2000. The bottom panels in Figure 1.1 illustrate how these shock time series trans-
late into individuals’ lifetime shock experiences, both in the cross-section and over time. The
bottom-left panel plots the average experiences for each of the three countries, and the bottom-
right panel plots the average experiences for young (age below 40), middle-aged (between 41
and 60), and old individuals (above 60). The plots highlight the three sources of variation that
are central to the identification strategy. Differences in individuals’ lifetime experiences depend
on their cohort and country of residence, and these evolve. First, in the bottom-left panel,
the average economic shock experiences among Americans is close to zero in years 2006-2007
(first survey wave) because the Great Depression occurred more than 70 years ago, and it re-
mains close to zero in years 2011-2012 (second survey wave) because no major economic shock
hit the U.S..6 Similarly, the average economic shock experience was close to zero in Spain in
years 2006-2007. However, Spain experienced a massive economic downturn in 2008, so that its
average economic shock experience increases in the years 2011-2012. By contrast, the average
economic shock experience in Argentina is high in the years 2006-2007, and it slightly decreases
by 2011-2012 because no economic shock occurred in-between. Second, the bottom-right panel
illustrates how shocks affect the economic shock experience of different age groups. Younger
cohorts’ shock experiences react the most to recent events. In Spain, for example, the economic
shock experience increases more strongly among the young than among the old; similarly, the
economic shock experience decreases the most among the young and the least among the old in
Argentina. As defined in equations 1.5 and 1.6, the younger the individuals, the more important
are the most recent shock experiences.
Table 1.2 shows the summary statistics. I focus on individuals from age 25 to 75. The data
set contains 126,808 observations from 78 countries. The mean importance that people assign
to norm conformity is 4.44.
6The drop in consumption during the Great Recession following the financial crisis of 2008 was smaller than
10%.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics main analysis
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
Importance of norm conformity 126,808 4.440 1.361 1 6
Negative shocks
Drought intensity experience 123,962 0.367 0.652 −1.643 2.242
Drought × High share agriculture 123,962 0.222 0.378 −0.591 1.905
Earthquake experience 126,808 0.007 0.017 0 0.131
Hurricane experience 85,195 0.002 0.009 0 0.075
Economic disaster experience 67,118 0.046 0.073 0 0.373
Individual covariates
Birth year 126,808 1964.5 14.0 1931 1997
Age 126,808 44.8 13.5 25 75
Gender, male 126,808 0.476 0.499 0 1
Unemployed 124,002 0.087 0.282 0 1
Education 116,616 5.782 2.239 2 9
Notes: Importance of norm conformity is taken from waves 5 and 6 of the World Values
Survey (WVS) conducted in years 2006-2009 and 2010-2014. Drought intensity expe-
rience measures individuals’ lifetime experience of PDSI drought intensity conditions.
The drought data comes from the Climatic Research Unit’s TS v.4.01. I construct
country-year level values from these data, as described in the text. Drought × High
share agriculture denotes the interaction of the lifetime experience of PDSI drought
intensity conditions with an indicator equal to one if the average country share of em-
ployment in agriculture in years 2000 to 2005 is above 25%. The information on the
employment share in agriculture comes from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI). Earthquake experience represents individuals’ lifetime experience of
significant earthquakes. The data come from the NOAA. Hurricane experience denotes
individuals’ lifetime experience of hurricanes and other tropical storms. The data come
from Yang (2008) and Mahajan and Yang (2020). Economic disaster experience is in-
dividuals’ lifetime experience of large drops in national consumption. The data come
from Barro and Ursúa (2008). I construct all experience variables as weighted lifetime
averages following the procedure in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and Malmendier and
Shen (2019). The WVS also contains individual-level covariates, including respondents’
birth year, age, gender, an unemployment status, and highest educational attainment.
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1.4 Results
I now turn to the estimates of the relationship between people’s experiences of negative shocks
and the importance of norm conformity today. In this section, I describe the empirical strategy
and present the results.
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
I exploit variation in exposure to negative shocks over people’s lifetime. Combining data from
various sources discussed in Section 1.3, I estimate a difference-in-differences model to examine
the effect of shock experiences on the importance people place in norm conformity. My baseline
specification is the following:







′xi + εibct (1.7)
where yibct is the importance placed in norm conformity by individual i from birth cohort b
and resident in country c; and αct and δb are full sets of country of current residence × survey year
and birth cohort fixed effects. Shock Experiencebc refers to the four different shock experience
measures which vary at the birth-cohort × country level: (i) drought experience; (ii) earthquake
experience; (iii) hurricane experience; and (iv) and economic downturn experience. I analyze
the shocks in four separate regressions, each regression examining the effect of one of the shock
experiences on the dependent variable. I assign the shock experience measures to individuals
based on the country they reside in at the time of the survey. In the baseline specification, xi
denote a gender indicator equal to one if i is male and a full set of age fixed effects. I allow
that idiosyncratic differences, εibct, are correlated across individuals within a given birth-cohort
× country.
β is the main coefficient of interest, capturing the effect of collective negative shock expe-
riences during individuals’ prior lifetime. By conditioning on country of current residence ×
survey year fixed effects, the empirical specification absorbs country-specific determinants of
norm conformity such as institutions, deep history, or current economic conditions and allow
these determinants to change over time of the survey data collection. By conditioning on birth
cohort fixed effects, the specification also absorbs all variations across cohorts that might induce
different degrees of norm conformity. Finally, by including age fixed effects, the specification
removes life cycle effects such as age-related increases in the value place in norm conformity.
In addition to the baseline specification, I estimate specifications that: (i) use alternative
clustering choices (country level, cohort level, and country-cohort two-way clustering); and (ii)
include additional individual-level (an indicator equal to one if i is unemployed and fixed effects
for highest educational achievement). Note that these individual-level controls may be “bad
controls” because negative shocks may also affect individuals’ employment status and educa-
tional choices. Still, including these controls in separate regressions allows me to examine the
robustness of the results.
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1.4.2 Identifying Assumption
The identification of shock experience effects comes from (i) within-country differences across
cohorts and (ii) cross-country differences in the importance of norm conformity and shock his-
tories and how they evolve. For example, the first comparison is between a U.S. resident born
in 1958 to a U.S. resident born in 1975; the second comparison is between a U.S. resident born
in 1958 and an individual born in the same year but resident in Japan. The effect is identified if
E(εit|αct, δb, xi) = 0 is satisfied. That is, the identification assumption is violated if unobserved
factors at the country-cohort level are systematically correlated with both the shock occurrences
and the importance placed on norm conformity. Natural disasters are arguably exogenous to
individuals. Fixed effects for countries of residence and birth cohorts remove the most obvious
confounding factors of major economic downturns.
1.4.3 Baseline Results
Figure 1.2 presents an overview of the main results from the baseline difference-in-differences
specification in equation 1.7. The bars depict the estimated effects of different types of natural
disaster experiences and major economic downturns experience on the importance individuals
place in norm conformity today. Each bar corresponds to a distinct natural disaster (droughts,
significant earthquakes, or hurricanes) or economic downturns in the form of large drops in
national consumption.7
Several consistent patterns emerge. First, all shock experiences are associated with an in-
crease in the importance placed in norm conformity. All estimates are positive and statistically
significant. Second, the point estimates are very similar across shocks. It is largest for hur-
ricanes and smallest for economic disaster, although the differences lie within the confidence
intervals. Note that all specifications include country of current residence fixed effects. This
implies that the effect is not merely driven by differential exposure to natural and economic
disasters across countries, but by differential experiences across cohorts within countries and
how these differences evolve between countries.
Table 1.3 reports the details of the estimation. Based on data from 76 countries from around
the world, drought experience generally leads to a higher importance of norm conformity, but
the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels (Column 1). The effect doubles in
size and becomes highly statistically significant when drought experience is interacted with an
indicator equal to one if the country share of employment in agriculture is above 25% (the median
share in the sample). This finding is consistent with the interpretation that drought shocks
have particularly adverse effects in countries where agriculture is a dominant share of economic
activity. In column 3, I additionally control for educational attainment and an indicator equal
to one if the respondent is unemployed. The result goes through if I account for these additional
(more endogenous) covariates, although the effect becomes smaller and is estimated with less
precision.
7The bar on drought shows the estimated coefficient of the interaction of individuals’ drought experience ×
an indicator equal to one if the national share of employment in agriculture is higher than 25%. This interaction

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20 Shocks and Norm Conformity






Drought Earthquake Hurricane Economic disaster
Impact on importance of norm conformity
 (in standard deviations)
Notes: The figure reports the estimated coefficient from regressions of respondents’ self-reported impor-
tance of norm conformity on their lifetime experiences of several types of natural disasters (droughts,
earthquakes, hurricanes) and large economic downturns. All regressions include fixed effects for country
of current residence × survey-year, birth cohort, age, and gender. The confidence intervals are at the
95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the country of residence × birth-cohort level. The dependent
variable comes from the World Values Survey. The data sources of the natural and economic disasters
and the measurement of lifetime experience are described in the text. All variables are standardized to
z-scores. Drought reports the interaction of lifetime drought experience × an indicator equal to one if
the average share of employment in agriculture in years 2000 - 2005 is greater than 25%, as described in
the text.
Columns 4 to 9 present the estimation results for earthquakes, hurricanes, and economic
disasters. The effects are positive and statistically significant across all specifications.
1.4.4 Effect Magnitudes
Are the statistically significant effects of natural disasters and economic downturns substantially
important? I assess their magnitude in two ways. First, I compare the effect sizes to the
distance between the average importance of norm conformity in the Netherlands and Egypt,
which are among the countries that emphasize norm conformity the least (the Netherlands) and
the most (Egypt). One standard deviation more hurricane experience is associated with 7.8%
of the distance between the two countries, a substantial effect size. For earthquakes, the effect
corresponds to 5.3% of the distance; for economic downturns, it is 3.7%; and for droughts in
agricultural countries, it is 3.2%.
Second, I compare the magnitudes to the correlations between the importance of norm con-
formity and several other important factors. For example, individuals who have completed
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secondary school or above tend to put less emphasis on norm conformity by 0.02 units.8 The es-
timated coefficients in Table 1.3 are between twice (economic disaster) and 4.5 times (hurricanes)
larger than this correlation. To give a second example: the effect sizes are between 0.2 and 0.45
times the correlation between the importance of norm conformity and an indicator if individuals
are religious. These comparisons also suggest that the effect magnitudes are substantial.
1.4.5 Robustness Checks
I also perform two robustness checks. First, I rule out that measurement error or selective
migration drive the estimated effect. Second, I assess the sensitivity of the results to individual
countries and cohorts.
Selective migration does not drive the results. To construct individual-level estimates
of shock experiences, I assign occurrences of natural disasters and economic downturns to in-
dividuals based on the country they reside in at the time of the survey. The procedure raises
the concern that selective migration may drive the result. For example, a positive association
between shocks and norm conformity would emerge if individuals who place little importance
on norm conformity migrate from countries hit by shocks to countries not hit by shocks. To
address this concern, I restrict the sample to native-born individuals. Compared to the main
analysis, this robustness check loses statistical power because only one of the two WVS waves
provides information on respondents’ immigration status. Thus, the sample sizes drop by more
than 50%. Appendix Table A.1 reports the results. The estimates are qualitatively similar,
although the substantially smaller sample sizes imply that not all coefficients are statistically
significant at conventional levels.
Individual countries or cohorts do not account for the results. I also assess the sensi-
tivity of the results to the exclusion of individual countries and cohorts. I rerun the specifications
but drop one country or cohort at a time. Figures A.9 to A.12 report the results. The estimated
coefficients are very similar to the baseline results.
1.4.6 It the Effect Symmetric?
Does norm conformity become less prevalent in good times? I extend the logic of the model
by examining the relationship between positive economic conditions and the importance of
norm conformity. I compute individuals’ experience of consumption growth rates using the
consumption data of Barro and Ursúa (2008) and the exact same procedure as before. Then,
I test whether people who have experienced higher growth rates in their prior lifetime place
less importance in norm conformity today. Table 1.4 reports the results. I find a negative and
statistically significant relationship. Column 1 indicates that a one standard deviation increase
in consumption growth experience is associated with roughly 5% of a standard deviation increase
in the importance of norm conformity. The effect size is very similar to the effects of negative
shocks but points in the opposite direction. Column 2 shows that controlling for additional
8To be consistent, I compare the effect sizes from the estimation to the conditional correlation between norm
conformity and educational attainment, net of country of residence × survey year fixed effects.
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individual-level covariates increases effect to close to 7% of a standard deviation. Thus, the
effect size corresponds to ca. 4-5% of the gap between the average emphasis of norm conformity
in the Netherlands and Egypt.
Table 1.4: The effect of economic growth experience on importance of norm conformity
Importance of norm conformity [std.]
(1) (2)
Economic growth experience [std.] −0.047∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
No. of countries 33 33
Country × survey-year FE Yes Yes
Cohort, age, gender FE Yes Yes
Other individual controls No Yes
N 66,955 61,441
R2 0.122 0.124
Notes: OLS estimates, robust standard errors are clustered at the country-
cohort level and reported in parentheses. An observation is an individual.
The outcome in all columns is self-reported importance of norm conformity.
The main independent variables are lifetime experience of growth rates in
national consumption. The data sources and the measurement of lifetime
experience are described in the text. All regressions include fixed effects for
country of current residence × survey year, birth cohort, age, and gender.
Other individual controls include a dummy equal to one if the respondent
is unemployed and fixed effects for highest educational attainment. All
variables are standardized to z-scores. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and *
p < 0.1.
1.5 Conclusion
Why is conformity to social norms in some societies more prevalent than in others? I tested
a hypothesis grounded in the cultural evolution literature: The more individuals have been
exposed to negative shocks that threaten their society’s survival, the more they conform to
social norms. While being costly to individuals in good times, conformity to social norms
becomes particularly beneficial in the face of shocks because it promotes collective action and
thereby increases a population’s chances of survival.
I tested this hypothesis using data on the occurrences of various types of shocks, including
three different types of natural disasters and major economic downturns. The results paint a
coherent picture: Be it in the form of droughts, earthquakes, hurricanes, or major economic
downturns, the experience of negative shocks strengthens the importance people place in con-
formity to the existing social norms. Conversely, individuals who have lived through periods of
high economic growth value norm conformity less.
These results shed light on three separate issues. First, while we increasingly understand the
evolutionary process that determines today’s differences in norms and cultural traits, we know
less about why some societies display substantially greater cultural variability than others. The
evidence in this paper suggests that such heterogeneity within groups follows an evolutionary
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logic, too. It is a function of a societies’ historical exposures to collective negative shocks.
Second, the paper provides a rationale for the rise in polarization and cultural backlash in
recent years. If groups have different norms, shocks may lead to polarization between groups
through their impact on norm conformity. Third, the article illuminates the prosocial effects
of short-run shocks. By increasing norm conformity, shocks promote prosocial behavior if the
most valued local norms are prosocial. Conversely, it is also possible that they foster antisocial
behavior, i.e., greater intolerance toward homosexuality, if this is what the local norms prescribe.
Future research might be able to study the behavioral consequences of greater norm con-
formity in response to shocks, and whether shocks also increase the willingness to punish norm
violators.
2 Political Threat and Propaganda: Evidence from
the U.S. South1
Joint work with Sebastian Ottinger
2.1 Introduction
Inflammatory propaganda in mass media can play an important role in political outcomes and
violence. This is particularly the case when autocratic elites resort to hate creating stories that
target certain ethnic or religious minorities. For example, hate stories broadcast by government-
backed radio stations persuaded Hutu individuals to join the killings of Tutsis in the Rwandan
genocide and stirred anti-Jewish violence in Nazi Germany (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Adena
et al., 2015). While mounting evidence suggests that propaganda can have serious consequences,
we know less about its determinants. Natural drivers of propaganda may be past or current
crimes committed by members of the targeted group or an evil ideology among members of the
elite in power. In this paper, we take a different perspective. We investigate the possibility that
propaganda may be the result of deliberate strategy responding to political threat.
Political threat refers to the fear among members of a dominant group of giving up political
control and resources to a minority group. The work of Blalock (1967) on minority-group
relations suggests that when two groups coexist with unequal access to political resources, the
dominant group will engage in a wide variety of methods, including propaganda, to secure
its privileged access to those resources. Building on this insight, models of the ‘supply of
hatred’ formalize the conditions under which political threat may be an important driver of
hate creating propaganda. According to Glaeser (2005), if a minority group fully supports one
of two rival parties, then the other party may resort to propaganda that stirs resentment against
the minority group to prevent the majority of the electorate from voting for the opponent. This
logic suggests that hateful propaganda is part of the toolkit of political actors who seek to divide
diverse coalitions.2
The best evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from studies examining the dynamics
of anti-Black propaganda in the U.S. South. Woodward (1955) describes a rise in anti-Black
antagonism after the Civil War, which was “was furthered by a sensational press that played up
and headlined current stories of Negro crime, charges of rape and attempted rape, and alleged
instances of arrogance.” Glaeser (2005) shows that the frequency of anti-Black articles in the
Atlanta Constitution increased between 1870 and the early 1900s and fell afterward until after
World War I. He also observes that these trends coincided with changes in the political landscape
and, in particular, with the rise and fall of the People’s Party, also known as the Populist Party.
1 This chapter should be cited as Ottinger, Sebastian and Max Winkler (2020): “Political Threat and Propa-
ganda: Evidence from the U.S. South”, Mimeo.
2Models of social identities such as Shayo (2009) also generate this hypothesis.
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The Populists were the first American party committed to redistribution from rich to poor.
They sought support among poor farmers, regardless of race, and advocated redistributionist
policies that would have disproportionately benefited the poor, including African Americans.
Their alliance with black voters was crucial for the success in the 1892 elections and threatened
the dominant position of the Democratic elites in the South.
In this paper, we test whether the relationship between political threat due to the emergence
of the Populist Party and the use of anti-Black propaganda in the media is causal. Direct
evidence has proved elusive for two reasons. First, a systematic empirical analysis requires
measurement of propaganda in the media, and thus detailed information on media content.
Such data sets have been unavailable until recently. Second, credible estimates of the effect of
political threat require an estimation strategy that deals with the multitude of unobserved factors
that may affect both political threat and propaganda. To make progress, we collect new fine-
grained measures of anti-Black propaganda by accessing the full text of several hundred Southern
newspapers over many decades, ranging from rural weeklies to big-city dailies. We measure
propaganda by counting the frequency of the word “rape” in co-occurrence with the word “negro”
on the same page relative to the total number of newspaper pages.3 Since newspapers were the
dominant mass media at the time and highly local in their readership, they are the ideal source
to measure variation in the supply of propaganda at the local level and over time.
To identify the effect of political threat on the spread of anti-Black propaganda in newspapers,
we exploit variation in the Populists’ unexpected success in the 1892 presidential elections in
a difference-in-differences setting. Specifically, the Populists’ success varied from state to state
and even between counties within states. Where they gained votes, the Populists posed a
more salient political threat to the local Democratic elites, providing them with an incentive to
turn poor white farmers against blacks by fanning racial fears and spreading hatred (Du Bois,
1935; Woodward, 1955). In our baseline analysis, we define that local Democrats perceived
political threat if the Populists gained a non-zero vote share in their county in the presidential
elections of 1892. We then compare newspapers from counties where Democrats experienced
threat to newspapers from counties where they were not (first difference), before and after 1892
(second difference). Importantly, our strategy allows us to include newspaper fixed effects,
which remove time-invariant newspaper traits, including newspaper ideology. We find that
newspapers in counties under political threat see a statistically and economically significant
increase in propaganda relative to newspapers in other counties after 1892. Importantly, we find
this effect only in newspapers that endorsed the Democrats in the presidential elections, but not
in newspapers affiliated with the Republicans, the Populists, or independent newspapers. The
spread of propaganda remains significantly higher until the early 1900s and abates afterward.
This decline likely reflects the collapse of the Populist Party in the years after the 1896 election,
which reduced the political incentive for Democrats to stir racial hatred.
Identification in our difference-in-differences specification rests on the assumption of parallel
trends: absent political threat due to the rise of the Populist Party, newspapers in counties where
the Populists gained votes would not have experienced a differential increase in propaganda. To
3The keyword selection is guided by Glaeser (2005) who uses a similar combination of keywords in his analysis
of anti-Black articles in the Atlanta Constitution. Anti-Black propaganda was often propagated through stories
of attacks by Blacks on the White community, often involving allegations of rape.
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assess the plausibility of this assumption in our context, we estimate a dynamic difference-in-
differences specification. We find no evidence for a pre-trend. Before the 1892 elections, anti-
Black propaganda did not change differentially in counties exposed to vs. counties not exposed
to political threat.
Another obvious concern with our result is that local Populist vote shares are not random.
Determinants of anti-Black propaganda that also correlate with the local presence of the Pop-
ulist Party may violate the parallel trends assumption of the difference-in-difference strategy.
In particular, the Populists were more successful in counties that suffered from the economic
downturn in the 1880s and 1890s (Eichengreen et al., 2019). It is conceivable that this economic
distress gave rise to differential dynamics in anti-Black sentiment. To address this concern,
we flexibly control for the effects of differences in local economic conditions. Specifically, we
include a broad set of socio-economic county characteristics, interacted with year dummies, as
control variables. The result corroborates our finding: the Populist political threat increases the
prevalence of propaganda in newspapers affiliated with the Southern Democratic elite.
We also provide evidence in support of the interpretation that the effect is driven by the
supply of propaganda. First, our evidence suggests that it is unlikely that local demand for racist
stories drives the effect. Newspaper fixed effects remove time-invariant differences in demand
across newspapers. Moreover, we control for the county-level Democrat vote shares in 1892,
interacted with year dummies. The vote share serves as a proxy for local demand for anti-Black
propaganda, and the interaction with year dummies flexibly removes demand effects that vary
over time. Again, the result is very similar, supporting the interpretation that the supply of
propaganda plays an important role in our setting. The finding is also consistent with the
evidence in Gentzkow et al. (2015), who demonstrate that the Reconstruction South was the
only place and period in American history during which state-level politics significantly affected
newspaper circulation and political affiliation. It is precisely this political control of newspapers
that we build our analysis on, and that makes a supply-side interpretation plausible. Second, an
increase in real rape crimes is unlikely to account for the effect. We replicate the analysis using
the extent to which newspapers report about rapes unrelated to African Americans as outcome
variable. The coefficient of this placebo test is statistically indistinguishable from zero and, if
anything, points in the opposite direction.
In light of the theory, we expect that political threat was felt more strongly in places where
the Southern Democratic elite had more to lose from the redistributionist policies that the
Populists advocated. We probe into the heterogeneity of the effect of political threat on anti-
Black propaganda using the average size of farms in counties as a proxy for white wealth. The
result suggests that the effect is stronger in counties with larger farms, and the magnitude of
the heterogeneity is large: a one standard deviation increase in farm size increases the effect by
31.5%. Moreover, the effect is stronger in counties with a larger population share of African
Americans, where the threat may have been more salient. As a placebo test, we also examine
the effect of the Populist Party on anti-Black propaganda in newspapers outside the Southern
states, where few African Americans lived. The Populists thus competed without relying on
the support of black voters. Using the same empirical specification, we find no evidence that
Populism per se affected anti-Black propaganda in newspapers.
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Finally, we document that the propaganda wave in Democratic newspapers is associated
with electoral gains for the Democratic party in subsequent elections. In particular, anti-Black
propaganda in the years 1892 - 1894 had a lasting impact on future voting outcomes, while we
find no evidence for an association before and after this period. This finding suggests that the
propaganda “worked”.
In sum, our results suggest that Southern Democratic elites responded to the emerging
Populist threat by spreading anti-Black propaganda in local newspapers and that the propaganda
was politically successful: counties with a larger increase in propaganda see stronger gains for
the Democrats by 1900.
Our findings contribute to several strands of literature. A series of theoretical papers have
formalized the idea, which goes back to Machiavelli, that elites may find it optimal to use
a divide-and-rule strategy to remain in power against challenges. In Acemoglu et al. (2004),
kleptocratic elites bribe pivotal groups to undermine competing alliances; in Padró i Miquel
(2007), the fear of being ruled by elites who favor a different group drives voters to accept rent-
extracting policies by their elites, even as those reduce their welfare; and in Shayo (2009), rich
elites may appeal to voters nationalist identity to implement less redistributive policies. Closest
to our setting is Glaeser (2005), who studies the supply of hate stories by politicians and voters’
demand for such stories. We provide robust empirical evidence that the Southern Democratic
elites circulated hate stories in the primary mass media of the time to divide an alliance of black
and white voters.
We further contribute to an empirical literature that studies the economics of persuasion
(reviewed in DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010) and the short- and long-run consequences of
propaganda (DellaVigna et al., 2014; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Cantoni et al., 2017; Durante
et al., 2019; Bursztyn et al., 2019). We exploit a historical setting where newspapers were the
single dominant source of information, and demand effects are less powerful because newspaper
markets were often under tight political control (Gentzkow et al., 2015). Our study shows that
political threat can be an important determinant of propaganda.
Our study also adds to papers and books on the economic history of the Postbellum South,
including racism and political repression of African Americans during the Reconstruction period
(e.g., Du Bois, 1935; Woodward, 1955; Margo, 1982; Foner, 1997; Cook et al., 2018). Our findings
suggest that the rise and fall of hatred of Blacks in the late 19th and early 20th century was a
political response to the redistributionist Populist movement of the 1890s. By measuring anti-
Black propaganda from newly digitized historical newspapers, we provide a new large-scale data
source that, we hope, will be helpful to many researchers in the field.
Finally, we contribute to a vast body of work spanning the fields of sociology, psychology,
political science, and economics that investigates the historical origins of racism in the United
States. While recent contributions highlight the importance of deep factors in shaping local
racist attitudes today (Acharya et al., 2018; Williams, 2019), our findings suggest that even
a short-lived spike in politically motivated propaganda affected racial attitudes for decades to
come.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 briefly describes the historical back-
ground, the features of the rise and fall of the Populist Party, its political platform, and how it
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created political threat for the incumbent Democratic Party in the South. Section 2.3 describes
our newspaper data set and how we measure anti-black propaganda and political threat at the
local level. Section 2.4 lays out the empirical strategy, discusses the identification assumptions,
and presents the main results and robustness checks. Section 2.5 investigates the extent to
which the increase in propaganda affected electoral outcomes in the following decades. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Historical Background
Three key features of the rise and fall of the Populist Party in the late 19th century make
it an ideal context to the effect of political threat on the spread of propaganda in the mass
media. First, the Populists’ success in the 1892 election was unexpected and varied at the local
level, providing us with a natural experiment. Second, the Populists initially sought support
among poor farmers, regardless of race, and advocated redistributionist policies that would
have disproportionately benefited African Americans. This diverse coalition and the Populists’
redistributionist policy demands map precisely into the conditions under which political threat
may become an important driver of hate creating propaganda. Third, the historical account
widely agrees that the incumbent Democrats perceived the Populists as a serious political threat
to their dominant position in the U.S. South. This perception provided the Democratic political
elites with an incentive to turn poor white farmers against blacks by fanning racial fears and
spreading hatred. We now describe these points in detail.4
2.2.1 The Rise of the Populist Party
The rise of the Populist Party as a significant political force in the South was unexpected. The
depression of the 1880s gave rise to several grass-root organizations of dissatisfied farmers that
blamed deflationary monetary policies and the monopoly power of railroad companies for the
dire economic situation of many farmers. Across the country, numerous local self-help groups
sprang up. These groups met at national and regional conventions to discuss ways to influence
policy by co-opting the major political parties. Yet, the formation of a new party was not the
goal until the early 1890s as many Southern participants at these conventions opposed the idea.
Led by Leonidas F. Livingston of Georgia, a number of southern delegates made it
perfectly plain that they would never consent to any program that would threaten the
unity of the white vote in the South and they promised to bolt the convention should
such action be taken. To avoid disruption, therefore, the third party decision was
waived and the convention devoted itself to the business of drawing up a satisfactory
list of demands. (Hicks (1928))
4We purposefully restrict the scope of this section to the historical features that are key to our research question
and the empirical analysis. Hicks (1931) and Goodwyn (1978) provide excellent histories of the Populist Party.
Du Bois (1935), Woodward (1955), and Hahn (2003) trace the history of the African American political struggle
in the U.S. Abramowitz (1953), Meier (1956), Shapiro (1969), and Saunders (1969) are excellent examples from
a large literature discussing the political role of African Americans during the time of the the Populist party.
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Overcoming this opposition, the Farmers’ Alliance established a full-fledged party before the
1892 election, where the Populist candidate James Weaver won 8.5% of the national vote and
garnered much support in the South. Figure B.1 displays the county vote shares in the South.
2.2.2 The Populists’ Political Platform
The Populists advocated redistributionist policies. Their 1892 party program highlighted in-
equality as a major concern:
The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for
a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the possessors of those, in
turn, despise the republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of
governmental injustice we breed the two great classes - tramps and millionaires.
Their demands included a graduated income tax, nationalization of the railroads, telegraphs,
and postal system, and an eight-hour workday. To alleviate the debt burden of poor farmers,
the Populists also called for reforms to monetary policies, including the free coinage of silver.
The national power to create money is appropriated to enrich bondholders; a vast
public debt payable in legal tender currency has been funded into gold-bearing bonds,
thereby adding millions to the burdens of the people.
Moreover, particularly in their early years, the Populists catered to African Americans in
the South. In many counties, African Americans even served as local candidates and were given
a voice in the party organization. This catering to the African Americans was in part political
arithmetic, in part reflection of an egalitarian conviction, and often both:
I am in favor of giving the colored man full representation. (...) He is a citizen just
as much as we are, and the party that acts on that fact will gain the colored vote of
the South. (President of the Texas Populists, cited in Woodward (1981))
According to Du Bois (1935), the potential gains from building an alliance of white and black
labor in the South were clear:
White labor in the South began to realize that they had lost a great opportunity,
that when they united to disfranchise the black laborer, they had cut the voting
power of the laboring class in two. White labor in the Populist movement of the
eighties tried to realign the economic warfare in the South and bring workers of all
colors into united opposition to the employer.
However, Populist support for African Americans faded over time. Some Populists dropped
their attempts to recruit Black voters and endorsed both anti-Black policies and racial hatred
after 1900. Thomas E. Watson, the Populist nominee for vice-president in the 1896 Presidential
election, is a case in point. He turned from an outspoken supporter of black enfranchisement in
the 1890s into a white supremacist after 1900. However, these changes typically occurred after
the 1890s, the period of our empirical analysis.
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2.2.3 The Populist Threat
Southern Democrats perceived the alliance between Populists and Black as a critical threat to
their dominant position in the South. According to the historical account, many Democrats
responded by fanning racial hatred, often in the form of newspaper stories of attacks of Blacks
on the White community. Their goal was to prevent African Americans from voting and scare
poor whites of negro domination if the Populists were to take control.
Alarmed by the success that the Populists were enjoying with their appeal to the
Negro voter, the conservatives themselves raised the cry of ’Negro domination’, and
white supremacy, and enlisted the Negrophobe elements. (Woodward (1955))
In several states in the South, Democratic governments also enacted laws that effectively
disenfranchised African Americans and poor Whites, the Populists’ most important supporters.
At the national level, the Democrats managed to co-opt the Populist party by taking over
some of their policy platforms. While this co-option led to the fall of the Populist party in
national politics after the 1896 election, several local Populist organizations continued to be
active into the early 1900s. For example, the Populists of North Carolina made it into government
by forming a coalition with the Republicans and stayed in office until after 1900.
2.3 Data and Measurement
Our difference-in-differences empirical strategy compares the prevalence of anti-Black propa-
ganda in newspapers from counties where the Populists were politically active in the 1892
presidential election to counties where the Populists did not receive any votes. This empiri-
cal strategy requires the measurement of propaganda in newspapers over time and county-level
data on electoral outcomes. This section describes our data source for newspaper content, the
method to measure anti-Black propaganda, spatial and temporal patterns in this measure, and
the definition of political threat at the county level.
2.3.1 Newspaper Data
To investigate the occurrence of anti-Black propaganda across newspapers and over time, we
draw on text data from newspapers.com, an extensive digital archive of historical and current
newspapers. The provider scans newspapers and generates text using optical character recogni-
tion (OCR). The database is one of the most comprehensive digital newspaper archives currently
available: it contains more than 550 million pages from over 17,000 newspapers – ranging from
big-city dailies to rural weeklies.
We have developed an automated script that accesses the database via a personal subscription
and downloads keyword frequencies. Specifically, we obtain the number of pages that a specified
keyword appears on in a given newspaper and year. The script also allows us to search for
co-occurrences of several keywords on the same page. We link the keyword frequencies to meta
information of newspapers, including the place of publication for each newspaper recorded by
newspapers.com and its longitude and latitude. Based on this information, we match each paper
to a state and county.
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Figure 2.1a displays the geographic distribution of newspaper locations in the data set over
time. More than 1,300 U.S. counties have at least one newspaper at some point in the database.
Importantly, the circulation of these newspapers was often highly local, typically limited to a
single county. Thus, we interpret newspaper location as a proxy for newspaper coverage.
(a) Location of publication of newspapers in full database
Year: 1900 Year: 1970
(b) Southern counties with any newspaper between 1885 and 1903
Figure 2.1: Geographic coverage of newspaper data set
Notes: Top panel: The map shows the locations of newspapers available from newspapers.com for 1900 and
1970. We exclude newspapers from Kansas because they are massively overrepresented in the database.
Bottom panel: The map shows counties in the U.S. South for which we have newspaper data. Counties
in dark (light) grey (do not) have newspapers at least once at any time between 1885 and 1903 and are
(not) part of the analysis. Our coverage represents 42% of the population in Southern states.
The database comes with two shortcomings. First, it does not contain the universe of U.S.
newspapers. When comparing the characteristics of counties with and without newspapers in
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the database, we find that counties with newspapers are more likely to be urban, have a higher
share of African Americans, and more manufacturing output per capita (unreported). Moreover,
not all titles have a complete run of issues digitized. Some titles only have one issue, while others
have thousands. This unbalancedness may cause problems for our estimation strategy if selective
entry or attrition of newspapers is systematically related to our outcome and both differences.
We will address these concerns in the analysis by assessing our estimates’ sensitivity to different
sample definitions.
Second, the database does not allow a search for keywords within specific types of newspaper
content, such as editorials or letters to the editor. While it is impossible to read all of the content
carefully, we verified the content of a random sample of 100 pages. Appendix Figure B.5 presents
two examples.
For our empirical analysis, we restrict the database to newspapers published in the U.S.
South between 1885 and 1903, the years around the presidential election of 1892. We are left
with a sample of 764 newspapers in 329 counties, representing 42% of the population in the
Southern states. Figure 2.1b displays the geographic coverage of the resulting data set. We
obtain particularly good geographic coverage for the states of Alabama, Louisiana, and North
and South Carolina.
2.3.2 Measurement of Anti-Black Propaganda
We measure anti-Black propaganda by implementing a word count exercise. For each year and
newspaper, we count frequencies of the keywords “rape AND negro”. In other words, we measure
the presence of the word “rape” co-occurring with the word “negro” on the same page.5
To control for changes in the size of newspapers and coverage of the database, we also
measure frequencies of the terms “monday OR tuesday OR wednesday OR thursday OR friday
OR saturday OR sunday”. We compute our measure of anti-Black propaganda as
Anti-Black Propagandai,t =
∑N
n=1 ni,t × 1(rape AND negro)
∑N
n=1 ni,t × 1(weekdays)
∗ 100 (2.1)
where n is the number of pages containing the keywords in newspaper i and year t. We
multiply the resulting numbers by 100 to interpret Anti-Black Propaganda as the fraction of
newspaper pages containing anti-Black propaganda in a specific newspaper and year.
Two issues with the measure are worth pointing out. First, the method of counting keyword
frequencies on a page is dictated by our data source. The database structure prevents us from
using more sophisticated methods to measure anti-Black propaganda in the newspapers.
Second, the resulting measure is a combination of reporting of (local and distant) rapes that
occurred, their amplification by the local press, op-eds, letters to the editors, and fabrications.
Building on the historical accounts, we argue that the bulk of the variation in the measure
reflects differential reporting about local rapes, coverage of national headlines, op-eds, letters,
and fabrications. We will come back to this point in the analysis. Specifically, we will provide
evidence that the measure does not merely reflect the reporting of local rapes.
5The keyword selection is guided by Glaeser (2005) who uses the same combination of keywords in one of his
analyses of anti-Black propaganda in the Atlanta Constitution.
Chapter 2 33
2.3.3 Descriptive Analysis
What are the spatial and temporal patterns of anti-Black propaganda in US local newspapers?
Figure 2.2 shows the geography of anti-Black propaganda, averaged from 1870 to 1965, using
counties as the unit of observation. It shows the cross-county distribution of deviations from
yearly averages, recovered as the residuals from regressing our propaganda measure on year fixed
effects. Darker red colors indicate above-average anti-Black propaganda in a particular county,
while darker blues indicate below-average values of anti-Black propaganda in newspapers of a
county. No data are available for counties in grey.
The map reveals two striking features. First, there are pronounced differences across regions.
Anti-Black propaganda is more common in the South as compared to the rest of the country.
Particularly states within the South Atlantic census division, such as North and South Carolina,
exhibit above-average values of propaganda. Still, it also holds for states in the East South
Central census division, such as in Alabama and Tennessee. Second, the map shows that sizeable













Figure 2.2: The geography of anti-Black propaganda in U.S. local newspapers.
Notes: This map shows the cross-county distribution of the residuals from regressing anti-Black pro-
paganda from 1880 to 1965 on year fixed effects, as described in the text. Darker red colors indicate
above-average anti-Black propaganda in a particular county, while darker blues indicate below-average
values of anti-Black propaganda in newspapers of a county. No data are available for counties in grey.
Next, we investigate how regional differences change over time. Figure 2.3a shows the time
variation by geographic region in the number of anti-Black propaganda in newspapers from 1880
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to 1965. We document several interesting patterns. First, anti-Black propaganda markedly
declined across all regions from 1880 to 1940; second, the South deviated from this long-term
trend between 1880 and the early 1900s, which is the period of our analysis. Third, we see an
increase in anti-Black propaganda after 1930 in the South and the Northeast, which becomes
most pronounced in the South after 1940. Fourth, anti-Black propaganda was always most
frequent in newspapers in the South, especially in the first 40 years of our sample period, and
particularly so from 1880 to 1900. After 1900 a decade-long convergence to the lower levels of
the Northeast, Midwest, and West sets in. Figure 2.3b depicts variation over time in anti-Black
propaganda in local newspapers for rural and urban counties.6 It shows that rural counties
primarily drove the increase in anti-Black propaganda in the late 19th century, where Populists
were particularly active.
To summarize, the raw data offers some preliminary evidence in support of the hypothesis.
Deviating from a general decrease in anti-Black propaganda in US local newspapers, Southern
and rural counties saw a short-lived spike in anti-Black propaganda between 1890 and 1900.
Variation across Southern counties in this short spike will be the focus of our analysis.
2.3.4 Political Threat
The second key empirical challenge is to measure political threat due to the rise of the Pop-
ulist Party at the local level. To this end, we collect data on electoral outcomes in the 1892
presidential election. For each county, we record the vote share of the Populist Party, provided
by ICPSR (Clubb et al., 2006).7 Appendix Figure B.1 depicts the Populist vote share in the
1892 Presidential election across counties in the US. It demonstrates that the Populists’ electoral
success varied from state to state and even between counties within states.
To operationalize political threat at the county level, we assume that where the Populists
gained votes, they posed a political threat to the local Democratic elites. This assumption is
motivated by the notion that what mattered to the local Democrat elites in their decision to
“enlist the Negrophobe elements” (Woodward, 1955) was the perceived political threat resulting
from the arrival of the Populists on the political stage, rather than their ability to attract a
sizable vote share. We define an indicator for political threat, 1(political threatc), equal to one
if the Populist Party received any votes in the 1892 elections. Appendix Figure B.2 shows that
this was the case in roughly 90% of counties, and Appendix Figure B.3 illustrates the counties
presumed to be under threat for which we have newspaper data. Almost all states have at least
one non-threatened county; however, most non-threatened counties are in Louisiana. Thus, we
will assess the sensitivity of our results to excluding Louisiana from the sample as a robustness
check.
We also test for the sensitivity of our results to alternative definitions of political threat. We
explore whether our findings replicate in regressions that i) define the threat indicator equal to
one if the Populist Party received a vote share higher than 10% in the 1892 elections, which
6We define rural counties as those with less than 200 persons per square mile in a given year. Yearly population
density is calculated by linearly interpolating population from decennial censuses from 1880 to 1970.
7Populist vote shares for counties in Alabama are zero or missing in this data set. We draw on online sources
to supplement these data.
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Anti−Black propaganda in newspapers (in %)
Figure 2.3: The evolution of anti-Black propaganda in U.S. local newspapers
Notes: This figure shows the time variation in the share of newspaper pages with anti-Black propaganda.
In Panel (a), each dot corresponds to the population-weighted average level of anti-Black propaganda in
a particular year in one of four broad geographic regions of the U.S. Panel (b) shows the population-
weighted averages for rural and urban counties. We define rural as counties with less than 200 persons
per square mile in a given year.
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results in an approx. even split into threatened and non-threatened counties (see Appendix
Figure B.4); ii) use vote share quintiles as main independent variable; and iii) include both the
vote share and the baseline indicator as independent variables.
2.3.5 Other Data Sources
Newspapers at the time were often highly partisan and openly endorsed a particular party.
Gentzkow et al. (2011) and Gentzkow et al. (2014) digitized newspaper directories that pro-
vide information about newspapers’ political affiliations in presidential elections. We link this
information to our newspaper data set to distinguish between newspapers that supported the
Democratic Party and those that endorsed other parties or were independent. Running the
analysis separately for Democrat and non-Democrat affiliated newspapers enables us to test
whether all newspapers report more about rapes committed by Blacks after the Populist threat
appeared in 1892 or whether this effect is limited to newspapers affiliated with the Democrats.
We link endorsement in the 1892 election when such information is available. For newspapers
that we cannot locate in 1892, we link the endorsement in the closest available year, i.e., in
years 1896, 1888, 1900, 1884, 1904, and 1880 – in this order. Finally, we access county-level
socioeconomic characteristics from the 1890 population census provided by Haines and Inter-
University Consortium For Political And Social Research (2010) and the residential segregation
index computed by Logan and Parman (2017)
2.4 Results
We now turn to the empirical analysis. In this section, we lay out the empirical strategy and
present the results.
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
We employ a difference-in-differences strategy with the first difference comparing the prevalence
of anti-Black propaganda in newspapers from counties where the Populists gained votes in the
1892 presidential election to counties where the Populists did not receive any votes. The second
difference compares changes in propaganda over time, in particular before and after the Populists
arrived on the political stage in 1892. To this end, we define a dummy 1(Postt) that equals one
from 1893 onward. We then investigate whether political threat is associated with an increase
in anti-Black propaganda in newspapers by estimating the following regression:
Anti-Black Propagandai(cr),t = αi + αrt + β 1( political threatc × 1(Postt) + ϵi(cr),t. (2.2)
The dependent variable Anti-Black Propagandai(cr),t, defined in the previous section, is the
measure of anti-Black propaganda in newspaper i in county c, census region r and year t. β
is the coefficient of interest. If political threat increases the spread of propaganda, we expect
that β > 0. Estimating regression (2.2) at the newspaper level allows us to control for time-
invariant newspaper characteristics by including newspaper fixed effects αi. This implies that
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the identifying variation comes from changes within newspapers over time. We control for year
×census region fixed effects αrt to remove variation that is year-specific across newspapers in
the same census region (South Atlantic, East South Central Division, or West South Central
Division). Standard errors ϵi(cr),t are clustered at the county-level, allowing for correlations of
unobserved variation across newspapers in the same county and over time. Appendix Table B.1
provides summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.
The central identifying assumption in our difference-in-differences framework is that of par-
allel trends in propaganda absent of treatment. In other words, absent political threat due to
the rise of the Populist Party, newspapers in counties where the Populists won votes would
not have experienced a differential increase in the spread of propaganda published therein. To
inquire into differential trends, we implement a dynamic difference-in-differences estimation by
estimating coefficients for each year separately. We then visually inspect yearly coefficients and
test for the existence of a pre-trend in anti-Black hatred in newspapers across groups.
2.4.2 Main Result
Table 2.1 reports the results of the estimation of equation (2.2). We find a large and statistically
significant relationship between political threat and the spread of anti-Black propaganda. The
result in column 1 suggests that, after 1892, newspapers spread more anti-Black propaganda
in counties where the Populist Party received a positive vote share in the 1892 presidential
election. Since we include fixed effects for newspapers and year × census region, we identify
the effect holding fixed newspapers’ time-invariant racial bias and newspaper-invariant national
and regional news affecting all newspapers in any given year and region. The effect size is large:
relative to newspapers in counties with no political threat, we find a standardized effect size of
0.156 after 1892.
Next, we split the sample into newspapers that did not endorse the Democrats and those
that did. Columns 2 and 3 report the results. Among 150 newspapers that were independent or
affiliated with parties other than the Democrats, we find no increase in anti-Black propaganda
after 1892. Instead, Democrat-affiliated newspapers drive the effect. For these, the estimate of β
is 12% percent larger, while the standard errors only increase slightly by 10%, despite the smaller
sample size. These results provide strong evidence supporting the narrative in Woodward (1955)
that Democratic elites spread anti-Black propaganda in newspapers to discredit the Populists in
the eyes of poor white voters. Democrat-affiliated newspapers in counties with political threat
increased the spread of anti-Black propaganda with a standardized effect size of 0.175 after 1892
compared to Democrat-affiliated newspapers in counties without political threat.
Ruling out pre-trends. Our result could reflect differential trends in anti-Black propaganda
that newspapers in counties with political threat followed already before the election in 1892.
If so, the election result of 1892 could itself be an outcome of these differential trends, and the
parallel trends assumption would be violated, which would invalidate our identification strategy.
We conduct a dynamic difference-in-differences analysis to check for pre-existing trends in anti-
Black propaganda. Figure 2.4 shows the coefficients of the regression of anti-Black propaganda
on the political threat indicator interacted with year dummies, using the set of Democratic
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Table 2.1: Effect of political threat on anti-Black propaganda.
Anti-black propaganda [std.]
All Non Dem. Democratic Newspapers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.156∗∗∗ 0.008 0.175∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.081) (0.045) (0.048) (0.053)
No. of newspapers 764 110 654 654 654
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic conditions × year FE No No No Yes Yes
Dem. vote share × year FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5,399 666 4,733 4,733 4,733
R2 0.502 0.602 0.496 0.525 0.530
Notes: This table shows that political threat due to the rise of the Populist Party increased
the frequency of anti-Black propaganda in newspapers. An observation is a newspaper-year
from 1885 to 1903. The outcome in each column is anti-Black propaganda in newspapers.
The main independent variable is an indicator equal to one if the Populist Party gained votes
in the presidential election of 1892 in the newspaper’s county (first difference) interacted
with an indicator equal to one for years greater than 1892 (second difference). All regressions
include newspaper and year × census region fixed effects. Column 1 shows the estimate
for the full sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to newspapers that do not endorse
the Democratic Party Column 3 to 5 focus on newspapers that endorse the Democratic
Party for which this information is not available. Column 4 adds county-level economic
controls, measured in 1890, and interacted with year dummies. These controls include
log population, black population share, residential segregation (in the year 1880), log per
capita output in manufacturing and agriculture, the average farm size, log railway miles per
square mile, the average indebtedness of farms (= mortgage value of farm/value of farms);
the average interest rate on farms mortgages, the share of share-cropping farms, and the
share of cotton acreage to total farm acreage. Column 5 adds controls for the vote shares
for the Democratic Party in the 1892 presidential election, interacted with year dummies.
All variables are standardized to z-scores. The standard errors are clustered on counties
and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels.
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newspapers and controlling for newspaper fixed effects and year × census region fixed effects as
in Column 3 of Table 2.1.
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Notes: This figure shows differences in anti-Black propaganda between newspapers in Democratic counties
with versus without political threat in 1892, based on the specification of Column 3 in Table 2.1. It shows
confidence intervals at the 95% (thin lines) and 90% (thick lines) level. Standard errors are clustered at
the county-level. The F statistic for all coefficients before 1892 is 0.69 (p = 0.68).
We fail to detect a visible or statistically discernible pre-tend in anti-Black propaganda. The
F statistic for all coefficients before 1892 is 0.69 (p = 0.68). Moreover, the graph shows that the
effect vanishes after the Populist Party collapsed in the years after the 1896 Presidential election.
This finding is in line with our interpretation of short-lived incentives to Democratic politicians
to spread anti-Black propaganda in newspapers in places where the Populists threatened the
Southern Democratic elites.
Differences in economic conditions do not drive the result. An obvious concern with
our result is that the Populists’ vote shares in the 1892 presidential elections are not random.
Determinants of the local presence of the Populist Party that also correlate with anti-Black
propaganda may violate the parallel trends assumption of the difference-in-difference strategy.
For example, Eichengreen et al. (2019) show that the Populists were more successful in counties
that suffered from the economic downturn in the 1880s and 1890s. It is conceivable that this
economic distress gave rise to differential dynamics in anti-Black sentiment. In column 4, we ad-
dress this concern by flexibly controlling for the effects of differences in local economic conditions
in the years before 1890. Specifically, we include a large set of county economic characteristics,
interacted with year dummies, as control variables: the log county population share, the county
population share of African Americans, residential segregation, log per capita manufacturing
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and agricultural output, average farm size, log miles of railways per square mile, average in-
debtedness of farms, average interest rates paid on farm debt, the share of cotton acreage to
total farm acreage, and the share of sharecropping farms of the total number of farms. The
latter two are motivated by the possibility that white plantation owners had an incentive to
fan racial hatred to prevent black and white sharecroppers from joining forces and fight for
higher wages. Column 4 shows that flexibly controlling for differences in these characteristics
increases the coefficient to a standardized effect size of 0.203 while leaving the standard error
almost unchanged. The result corroborates our finding: the Populist political threat increases
the prevalence of propaganda in newspapers affiliated with Southern Democratic elites.
Controlling for differential increase in demand for propaganda. Based on histori-
cal accounts (Woodward, 1955) and the weak competitive forces in Southern media markets
(Gentzkow et al., 2015), we argue that newspapers supply propaganda; that is, political actors
such as newspaper editors, owners, and local officeholders were in the position to spread anti-
Black propaganda in their newspapers. A competing view is that newspaper content is largely
driven by readers’ demand.8 This view raises the concern that any increase in anti-Black pro-
paganda after 1892 may be due to local demand for such content. While our newspaper fixed
effects remove time-invariant differences in newspaper ideology and local demand, it may still
be the case that differential shifts in demand over time may confound the result. To address
this concern, we also control for the county-level Democrat vote share in the 1892 presidential
election, interacted with year fixed effects. The vote share proxies local demand for anti-Black
propaganda, and interaction with year dummies allows the demand effect to vary flexibly over
time. Column 5 in Table 2.1 reports the result. The effect remains positive and highly statisti-
cally significant but loses roughly 18% of its effect size. Thus, the finding is in line with local
preferences driving some of the demand for newspapers, but local demand plays a lesser role in
our setting. Even with such a demanding specification, β is precisely estimated and sizable.
No differential increase in reporting of rapes unrelated to African Americans. In
the previous section, we pointed out that our dependent variable reflects a combination of
reporting of actual rapes (local and distant), their amplification by the local press, and op-
eds, letters to the editors, and fabrications. This measurement raises the question of how to
interpret the results; in particular, if the actual incidence of rapes increased in counties where
the Populists entered local politics, our estimate of β could reflect accurate reporting. The best
solution to this problem would be to control for the actual occurrences of rapes by using yearly
crime statistics from primary sources with information on the type of crime and the race of the
offender. Unfortunately, such data are not readily available, and would potentially still reflect
biases in the local judicial system.
As an alternative solution, we conduct a placebo test, where we estimate the effect of political
threat on the extent to which newspapers report about rapes unrelated to African Americans. To
do so, we estimate such rapes’ reporting by counting the occurrence of the keyword “rape” and
8Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) show that for the U.S. from 1972 to 1998, demand for media slant, as revealed
in local political vote shares, are a more important determinant of newspaper slant than is the identity of the
ownership group.
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subtract the number of times “rape” co-occurs with “negro” in local newspapers. We aggregate
the frequencies to the newspaper-year level, normalize it by the measure for overall text length.
Then, we replicate the previous regressions using the new outcome. Appendix Table B.7 shows
that the coefficients of this placebo test are statistically indistinguishable from zero and, if
anything, point in the opposite direction.
No effect outside the South, where political incentives to spread propaganda were
absent. Finally, we examine the effect of the Populist Party on anti-Black propaganda outside
the Southern states, where few African Americans lived. The Populists thus competed without
relying on the support of black voters. In the Midwest, for example, the Populists’ were hugely
successful in the 1892 election – they carried entire states such as Kansas or Colorado – but
their position on race was less salient. Thus, we expect that the Populist Party’s presence did
not create an incentive for white elites to spread anti-Black propaganda because there was no
diverse coalition to split.
Table 2.2 reports the result of this placebo test. Using the same specifications as before, we
fail to detect an effect outside the South. The coefficients are small and change signs between
specifications. We therefore conclude that the Populist Party’s presence did not affect the spread
of anti-Black propaganda in non-Southern states. This finding provides another piece of evidence
in support of the hypothesis.
In sum, our results suggest that political threat due to the rise of the Populist Party increased
the spread of anti-Black propaganda in Democratic newspapers in the South. The effect is
unlikely to be driven by shifts in factors related to economic characteristics or in demand for
racist content, nor do we find evidence that real occurrences of crimes differentially increased.
Lastly, we fail to detect an effect in places where the political incentives to spread anti-Black
propaganda were generally absent.
2.4.3 Robustness
We now turn to the examination of the sensitivity and robustness of our baseline estimates.
Alternative definitions of political threat. So far, we assumed that a vote share greater
than zero for the Populists created political threat for the Democratic elites. We now show that
our findings replicate if we replicate our analysis using three alternative definitions of political
threat. First, we define the political threat indicator equal to one if the Populists received a
vote share higher than 10% in the 1892 presidential elections. According to this definition, the
elites ca. half of the counties in our sample are assumed to perceive threat. Appendix Table B.2
shows that all the conclusions of the analysis go through. The effect sizes become slightly
smaller, possibly because elites perceived threat even when the Populists gained a vote share of
less than 10%. Second, we add the vote share for the Populist Party to the regression. Table B.3
shows that while the coefficient on Populist vote share is positive across specifications, the effect
mainly comes from the political threat indicator. Third, we use quintiles of the Populist vote
share as main independent variables. This definition allows us to examine whether a higher
Populist vote share has a stronger effect on propaganda, arguably because it created a more
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Table 2.2: Placebo: Non-Southern states.
Anti-black propaganda [std.]
Northeast Midwest West All regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.022 −0.050 −0.050 −0.007 0.029 0.023
(0.022) (0.043) (0.043) (0.029) (0.032) (0.033)
No. of newspapers 394 494 77 965 965 965
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic conditions × year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Dem. vote share × year FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 4,017 4,251 4,251 9,073 9,073 9,073
R2 0.334 0.375 0.375 0.364 0.387 0.389
Notes: The table shows that the Populist Party’s presence did not increase the frequency of anti-
Black propaganda in non-Southern states. An observation is a newspaper-year from 1885 to 1903.
The outcome in each column is anti-Black propaganda in newspapers. The main independent
variable is an indicator equal to one if the Populist Party gained votes in the newspaper’s county
in the presidential election of 1892 (first difference) interacted with an indicator equal to one for
years greater than 1892 (second difference). All regressions include newspaper and year fixed
effects. Columns 1, 2, and 3 restrict the sample to states in the Northeast, Midwest, and West,
respectively. Column 5 adds controls for county-level economic conditions in 1890, interacted
with year dummies. These controls are described in Table 2. Column 6 adds controls for the
Democratic Party’s vote shares in the presidential elections of 1892, interacted with year dummies.
All variables are standardized to z-scores. The standard errors are clustered on counties and
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels.
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salient political threat. Table B.4 reports positive and statistically significant coefficients for
higher quintiles of Populist vote shares but not for lower quantiles. In sum, our main finding is
robust to different definitions of political threat at the county level.
Balanced panel. The newspaper database is highly unbalanced. While some newspapers are
available over many years, most newspapers are available for short periods only. An unbalanced
panel may cause problems for our estimation strategy if the entry and attrition of newspapers are
systematically related to our outcome and both differences. To deal with this concern, Appendix
Table B.5 focuses only on the balanced panel of 60 newspapers from 1885 to 1903. With the
substantially smaller sample, we obtain larger and highly statistically significant coefficients.
This result lends empirical support to the assumption underlying our main result. Neither
newspapers’ selective entry or exit, nor their inclusion into the digitized sample drive the results.
If anything, these factors work against us.
Dropping Louisiana. Table B.6 drops all observations from Louisiana, where no county voted
for the Populist presidential candidate in the 1892 election because Democrats and Populists
combined their electoral tickets in 1892 (White, 1918). This fusion constrains our ability to
identify political threat at the county level in our election data. Nevertheless, the same issues
that drove poor white and black voters to the Populists elsewhere were also at work in Louisiana.9
Therefore, we are concerned that including Louisiana and implicitly assuming that the Populists
received zero vote share across counties introduces a downward bias, as we expect that Democrat
elites in Louisiana also resorted to propaganda to respond to the Populist threat. Reassuringly,
Table B.6 shows that our estimates barely change when we drop Louisiana from the sample.
2.4.4 Heterogeneous Effects
We now probe into the heterogeneity of the effect. First, we explore whether the effect size
varies based on pre-existing wealth differences among Whites. In light of the theory, we expect
that white elites felt more threatened when they had more to lose from the redistributionist
policies that the Populists advocated. We proxy white wealth by the average sizes of farms
in counties. Column 1 in Table 2.3 reports the result. We find a positive and statistically
(marginally) significant coefficient on the interaction term. The magnitude of the coefficient on
the interaction term is large: a one standard deviation increase in farm size is associated with a
more than 31% stronger effect of political threat.
Next, we examine whether the effect was stronger in rural than in urban counties. The
Populists sought support among poor farmers. We, therefore, expect that elites in rural counties
perceived more threat than in urban counties. Column 2 reports a negative coefficient on the
9According to (White, 1918): “By entering into the fusion agreement, it was asserted, the people’s party was
merely fighting the democrats with their own methods. In concluding, an appeal was made to the voters to
have the manhood to assert their rights, not to let the scarecrow of negro domination longer drive them to the
democratic wigwam, and to rally to the standard of the people’s party and elect the fusion ticket as a re buke
to ’the Democrats in their strength, and the Republican party in its weakness. May Louisiana break the ’solid
south’ and greet our great toiling brethren of the North and West with the cheering hope of industrial reform in
the near future.”
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interaction between political threat and log county population; however, the coefficient is not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
We also assess whether the effect is stronger in places with a larger share of African American
residents or in more segregated counties. Columns 3 and 4 show a positive coefficient on the
interaction with the county population share of African Americans and a negative coefficient
on the interaction with residential segregation. This result suggests that the effect of political
threat on propaganda is more substantial in places with more African Americans and where
African Americans were more likely to live next to Whites. These findings are consistent with
the possibility that the perceived threat was more serious when African Americans were more
salient to white residents.
Table 2.3: Heterogeneity in the effect of political threat on anti-Black propaganda.
Anti-black propaganda [std.]
Democratic Newspapers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.181∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046)
× Avg. farm size [std.] 0.057∗ 0.061∗
(0.032) (0.033)
× Log population [std.] −0.024 −0.010
(0.028) (0.027)
× Share black pop. [std.] 0.019 0.049∗
(0.020) (0.029)
× Residential segregation [std.] −0.015 −0.040
(0.022) (0.027)
No. of newspapers 654 654 654 654 654
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,733 4,733 4,733 4,733 4,733
R2 0.497 0.496 0.496 0.496 0.498
Notes: This table shows that the effect of political threat on anti-Black propaganda is
stronger in places with larger farms and a larger population share of African Americans.
An observation is a newspaper-year from 1885 to 1903. The outcome in each column is
anti-Black propaganda in newspapers. All regressions include newspaper and year-census
division fixed effects. The sample is restricted to that endorse the Democratic Party and
for which this information is not available. All variables are standardized to z-scores.
The standard errors are clustered on counties and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels.
2.5 Did the Progaganda Affect Voting?
Our findings provide insights into a so-far untested determinant of propaganda. Since previous
studies have found that propaganda can affect behavior, the question arises whether, in our
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context, the propaganda “worked”. Did it sway people to vote for the Democrats? To investigate
this question, we examine whether anti-Black propaganda during the 1890s is associated with
electoral outcomes in subsequent elections. Specifically, we test if counties see stronger electoral
gains for the Democrats in the early 20th century if Democratic newspapers spread more anti-
Black propaganda during the 1890s. We estimate the following equation,
Dem. V ote Sharec, 1900, ..., 1916 =
1900∑
t=1885
βt propagandai(c)t × Dt
+ Dem. V ote Sharec, 1892 + X
′
cγ + εi(c)t
where Dem. V ote Sharec, 1900, ..., 1916 and Dem. V ote Sharec, 1892 denote the county-level
vote shares for the Democratic Party in years 1900, 1904, 1908, 1916 and 1892, respectively;
propagandai(c)t captures the prevalence of anti-Black propaganda in local newspapers; Dt is an
indicator variable for each year; X ′c denotes a vector of region fixed effects and the same county-
level socioeconomic characteristics that we use and describe in the main analysis (Section 2.4.2);
and εc is the error term. Standard errors are clustered on counties. The coefficients of interest
are βt, in particular for the years after 1892, when the Populists threatened Southern Democrats.
Table 2.4 reports the results. In most years after 1892, it shows a positive association between
anti-Black propaganda in Democrat-affiliated newspapers and the Democratic vote share in
future elections. Moreover, the relationship is highly statistically significant for propaganda
in 1893, when Southern Democrats perceived the Populist threat for the first time. Thus, we
find suggestive evidence that the propaganda was politically successful: counties with a larger
increase in propaganda see stronger gains for the Democrats in presidential elections by 1900.
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Table 2.4: Effect of anti-Black propaganda on future Democratic vote share.
1900 1904 1908 1912 1916
Democratic vote share in year [std.]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1886 0.036 −0.004 0.007 0.005 −0.013
(0.043) (0.033) (0.029) (0.033) (0.045)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1887 0.052∗∗ −0.004 −0.004 0.006 0.008
(0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1888 0.065∗∗∗ 0.019 0.027 0.037∗ 0.015
(0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1889 0.055∗∗∗ 0.010 0.020 0.027 0.015
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1890 0.031 −0.001 −0.006 0.000 −0.002
(0.026) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1891 0.028 0.008 0.016 0.014 0.017
(0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1892 0.064∗ 0.038 0.033 0.044 0.064∗∗
(0.037) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.028)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1893 0.076∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1894 0.083∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.045 0.062∗∗ 0.041
(0.036) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1895 0.042 0.031 0.017 0.011 0.002
(0.026) (0.022) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1896 0.034 0.010 0.019 0.018 0.012
(0.031) (0.028) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1897 0.012 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 −0.014
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1898 0.041∗ −0.003 −0.005 0.007 −0.008
(0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1899 0.039∗∗ 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.007
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Anti-black propaganda [std.] × Year 1900 0.024 0.013 0.011 0.011 −0.001
(0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
No. of counties 276 276 276 276 276
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dem. vote share 1892 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,578 3,587 3,587 3,587 3,587
R2 0.674 0.716 0.700 0.628 0.636
Notes: This table shows that anti-Black propaganda after 1892 affected the Democrat vote share
in subsequent presidential elections. An observation is a newspaper-year from 1886 to 1900. The
sample includes newspapers that endorse the Democratic Party and for which this information is not
available. All regressions include census region fixed effects, county-level economic controls, which
are described in Table 1, and the vote share for the Democratic Party in 1892. All variables are
standardized to z-scores. The outcome in each column is the vote share for the Democratic Party
in presidential elections in the years 1900 - 1916. The standard errors are clustered on counties and
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels.
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2.6 Conclusion
This study provides empirical evidence for the hypothesis that autocratic political elites resort
to hate creating propaganda when a diverse coalition threatens their dominant position. We
exploit the rise of the redistributionist Populist party in the presidential 1892 election and the
threat they posed to Southern Democratic politicians by aligning the interests of white and black
poor farmers. We find that newspapers fanned racial hatred aimed at preventing poor Whites
from voting for the Populists.
The empirical analysis makes use of a novel measure of anti-Black propaganda based on
text data from an extensive corpus of newspapers. In a difference-in-differences framework, we
show that newspapers in counties where the Populists received votes in the 1892 presidential
election spread more anti-Black propaganda in the following years compared to newspapers in
counties where the Populists did not pose a threat. Our results are identified from within-
newspaper variation driven by newspapers affiliated with the Democrats, lending support to our
interpretation that the effect is due to the supply of propaganda. The evidence also suggests
that the effect is not present outside the South, where the political incentive to spread anti-Black
propaganda was absent. Moreover, the effect is neither due to an increase in demand for such
content nor due to differences in economic conditions. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that
a rather short period of anti-Black propaganda shaped political outcomes for decades to come.
3 Traditional Belief Systems and Economic Behavior:
Evidence from Beer Retailers in the Eastern DRC1
Joint work with Raul Sanchez de la Sierra
3.1 Introduction
Traditional religious beliefs – such as beliefs in supernatural powers or ancestral spirits – are
widespread today and permeate the historical account. The average number of people who re-
port believing “witchcraft” or the “evil eye,” two common examples of traditional supernatural
beliefs, is shown visually in Figure 3.1. While the beliefs can be found across the globe, they are
especially strong in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the near-universal adoption of Islam and Chris-
tianity, traditional practices linked to ancestral supernatural powers remain common. Several
countries report rates that are well over 90% in all parts of the country (Gershman, 2016).
Despite such statistics, the true strength of these beliefs is not known. More importantly,
even if these beliefs were strongly held, we do not know the extent to which they affect psycho-
logical well-being, economic choices, and ultimately, economic growth. This issue is particularly
important for the field of economic development. While such traditional religious beliefs are
well-recognized and widely studied in other fields, such as anthropology and history, within
economics they have not been widely integrated into our understanding of human behavior,
whether it be social or economic.2
In this paper, we randomly supply protection rituals that provide a supernatural protection
spell to a group of 35 beer retailers from rural villages in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). Eastern DRC provides a suitable testing ground to examine the prevalence, and
relevance, of beliefs in non-falsifiable ancestral supernatural forces. First, the region experiences
high insecurity of property rights, and as a result the retailers’ main concern is that their beer
stocks may be subject to theft, often at gunpoint. As a result of the perceived insecurity, beer
retailers reduce their levels of beer inventories, and frequently run stock-outs, limiting their
ability to sell. Second, as in most sub-Saharan Africa and much of the world, there are diverse
forms of supernatural protection against bad events. Within this area the magic is called gri-
gri. The spells generally involve a ritual, an enchanting of an object, and the requirement that
1 This chapter should be cited as Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul and Max Winkler (2020) “Traditional Belief Sys-
tems and Economic Behavior: Evidence from Beer Retailers in the Eastern DRC”, This research was approved by
the Institutional Review Boards (IRB) of Berkeley (Protocol: 2016-06-8849; FWA: 00006252), Chicago (Protocol:
IRB20-0927), and Harvard (Protocol: SITE18-0356; FWA: 00004837).
2There are a number of important exceptions to this statement. For pre-existing scholarship within economics
on the consequences of traditional belief systems within sub-Saharan Africa, see for example Gershman (2015),
Gershman (2016), Alonso et al. (2016), Nunn and Sanchez de la Sierra (2017), Alidou and Verpoorten (2019),
and Stoop and Verpoorten (2020).
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specific conditions be followed for the protection to remain in place.
Figure 3.1: Prevalence of beliefs in witchcraft or the evil eye
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Notes: The map displays nationally representative data collected by the Pew Forum in several survey
waves between 2009 and 2017. The surveys asked respondents to indicate (i) whether they believe in
witchcraft, and (ii) whether they believe in the evil eye or that certain people can cast curses or spells
that cause bad things to happen to someone. In Western European countries, the survey asked the evil
eye but not the witchcraft question. We calculate the country-level shares of individuals who believe in
witchcraft or the evil eye (or both) using the sampling weights that come with the survey data.
We consider anti-theft protection rituals performed by reputable witch doctors of the area.
Anti-theft protection spells, which are provided through the hour-long in-person rituals, it is
believed, reduce the likelihood that beer inventories will be subject to theft. During the ritual,
the witch doctor invokes the ancestors of the tribe, communicates with them the desire that they
protect his subject, and performs a ceremony that often involves chants, dance, and a variety of
animal and vegetable products applied either to the subject or to an object. At the end of the
ritual, an object is provided that embeds the newly acquired protective powers. The powers are
expected to work as long as the object is placed in the store and certain necessary conditions
(i.e., actions) are followed.3 The rituals were provided by three different witch doctors who were
from three different regions, which we identified following thorough background checks aimed at
getting the most reputable among legitimate witch doctors.
We use an administrative dataset that provides detailed retail information at the day level.
We randomize the exact date at which a beer seller receives a ritual, which allows us to exploit
within-individual variation over time as well as between individual variation. To causally es-
timate the effect of receiving supernatural protection, we compare ‘treated’ observations (days
when a beer seller is protected) with ‘non-treated’ observations. Using this design, we estimate
the effects of the rituals, and the protection that they provide, on economic and psychological
outcomes of the protected beer sellers and examine the dynamics of such effect.
We find that, for the retailers who believed in the spell, the ritual reduces their self-reported
perceived risk of theft. For these retailers, the ritual also increases product purchases and their
3In all three regions, the object protected against theft, while in Walikale, the object was also promised
to provide good luck, which would result in increased sales. In Walikale the ritual offered could not separate
protection from luck.
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average stock of inventory, effects that are consistent with their perception of lower probabilities
of theft. As a consequence, retailers are less likely to have stock-outs, resulting in increased
sales, revenues, and profits. By contrast, we find no such effects for the retailers who did not
believe that the rituals worked.
The economic and social benefit of the rituals raises the question of why every beer seller
did not already have a protection spell. From focus groups, the primary reason appears to
be cost. Traditionally, the cost of this particular gri-gri was one goat. Today, the monetary
equivalent (approximately $40–50) is also accepted. Thus, the gri-gri can be viewed as a valuable
investment to make if one has the liquidity to pay for it, similarly to schooling or hospital visits.
Thus, some purchase and some do not. Within our sample, we find that before we provided the
protection spell, some individuals – 13 of 35 (37%) – had purchased a protection spell at some
point in the past two months. According to our estimates, the average increase in profits during
our sample period is $14 after two weeks, $40 after one month, and $61 after two months.
Our findings contribute to a number of literatures from different fields. First, outside of
economics, the role that superstitions, rituals, and religious beliefs play in helping individuals
cope with stress, uncertainty, or trauma has been long-recognized. However, studies tend to
either be descriptive case studies (e.g., Malinowski, 1948; Sosis and Handwerker, 2011) or based
on cross-sectional correlations (e.g., Bryant-Davis, 2013). One of the best-known studies of this
type is Malinowski’s (1948) study of the Trobriand Islanders of Melanesia. In the study, Mali-
nowski documents their magic and rituals, and argues that one tends to observe the presence of
magic when there is uncertainty. In his view, magic was a way to help the Trobriand Islanders
cope in the face of uncertainty. He provides the example of fishing on the island. There were
two types of fishing: lagoon fishing, which occurs in the calm inner waters, and deep-sea fishing,
which occurs in the dangerous open ocean. Malinowski documents that rituals and magic were
associated with deep-sea fishing but not lagoon fishing. Deep-sea fishers performed elaborate
magical rituals to help ensure a safe trip and good results (Malinowski, 1948). Our findings
contribute to this literature by providing causal estimates of the effect of such rituals on psy-
chological well-being and economic decision-making, and thus provide a first experimental test
of Malinowski’s hypothesis as well as whether rituals have economic consequences.
Second, the findings contribute to existing laboratory studies that attempt to detect the
existence of false beliefs. Augenblick et al. (2016) use a lab-based experiment to test the strength
of a religious group’s belief in the ending of the world in 2011, a belief that may be ex-ante false
(and most likely is false). Consistent with their setting, individuals in our study report to
have strong beliefs in non-falsifiable supernatural protection, and, consistent with their findings,
we find that individuals who report having such beliefs change economic decision-making in
accordance with such beliefs. However, our study’s scope differs in a number of ways. First,
behavior in the lab, where monetary incentives are often relatively small relative to individuals’
income, are subject to self-image concerns and cognitive dissonance. For instance, individuals
may be willing to pay a small cost so that their behavior aligns with the beliefs they are would
like to have, even if they do not truly hold such beliefs. Our study addresses this concern by
examining behavior related to the main source of income. The economic costs that individuals
in our sample are willing to undergo would imply implausibly high self-image concerns if they
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were driven by self-image concerns. Second, our study is focused on real-life decision making, in
a way that allows us to forgo external validity concerns of the lab, and also compute the returns
on investment to obtain such a ritual.
Finally, our findings are particularly important for today’s policy in many countries. When
engaging with non-Western societies, Western governments and NGOs frequently develop poli-
cies aimed at discouraging traditional superstitions and rituals. For example, in 2015 the Tan-
zanian government banned witchdoctors, citing the reports of albino killings undertaken by the
doctors (Smith, 2015). Second, traditional rituals are explicitly discouraged by many govern-
ments because they are often perceived as forces that governments cannot control, and that
potentially diminish their ability to govern. In the DRC, for instance, protection rituals are
discouraged by the Congolese government and military, in part, because it is seen as a threat
to the authority of the state. Given such efforts to reduce participation in traditional rituals,
it is important to understand the consequences, whether they be negative or positive, of such
practices. If they serve certain functions or have certain benefits, then it is important to un-
derstand these before policies that discourage or outlaw such practices are implemented. Our
study provides a humble step in that direction, quantifying the partial equilibrium marginal
psychological and economic benefits from the rituals.
Section 3.2 provides the context. Section 3.3 presents the details of the intervention. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents the strategy to measure outcomes. Section 3.5 presents the empirical strategy
to produce causal estimates. Section 3.6 presents the estimated effects of the rituals. Finally,
Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Context
Before turning to our experiment, we first describe the setting and context of its environment.
3.2.1 Rural Nord Kivu
We study beer retailers in Nord Kivu, a province of Eastern DRC. Although nearly 100% of
the population reports being Christian or Muslim, the use of traditional magic is widespread.
Rituals that protect against theft or that helps to increase sales are particularly prevalent among
our sample’s population.
Beliefs about supernatural protection are present in all strata of society, having become more
widely used with the rise in conflict in the region in recent decades. The region has experienced
persistent insecurity and conflict since the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, when Hutu militia fled
Rwanda into this area. It was the epicenter of the First Congo Civil War (1996–1997) and the
second Congo Civil War (1998–2003), and dozens of militant groups, especially uncoordinated
armed bandits, continue to operate today in this region, regularly engaging in violence, taxation,
and often unpredictable theft. In this environment, retailers and households are exposed to weak
property rights protection. In our baseline data, theft occurs in between 2–5% of days; in other
words, theft occurs, on average, once every 20 to 50 days for the typical beer seller.
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3.2.2 Beer distribution in rural Nord Kivu
Beer sellers are a particularly well-suited population to examine the economic consequences of
insecurity and beliefs about property rights protection.
The distribution of beer in the DRC is split into two major supply chains. On the one hand,
there is the firm Bralima, which is owned by Heineken. Bralima owns six breweries across the
country and is estimated to control two-thirds of the country’s beer market. While Bralima has
no brewery in North Kivu, daily boats ship large volumes of its beers from its brewery in Bukavu
(the capital of Sud Kivu) to Goma (the capital of Nord Kivu). From there, it is distributed in
Goma and through the rural areas of North Kivu. Bralima bottles and distributes several beer
varieties, including the famous Heineken beer and a popular Congolese beer named Primus.
On the other hand, there are other distribution networks tied to a French consortium. The
beers they sell are distributed through several areas of North Kivu and compete with the beers
distributed by Bralima.
From its wholesalers in Goma and other provincial towns, the beer is then distributed to
retailers. There are approximately 100 urban retailers and 150 rural retailers in North Kivu
alone. Retailers sometimes receive the beer shipments directly from wholesalers. Retailers in
certain locations must travel to the wholesaler to replenish their stock, which exposes them
to theft along the road. Some retailers have exclusivity clauses with the firm behind their
wholesaler, allowing them only to trade beer from that firm, and fixing the price at which they
are allowed to sell (a practice known as retail price maintenance). These retailers often obtain,
in exchange, an initial investment as well as marketing material from their respective firm. The
other retailers are free to trade beer from any firm. The firms conduct ghost consumer audits to
ensure that the price offered is consistent with the retailer contract. Such audits are especially
easy to implement in cities, leading to Bralima’s belief that deviations are frequent in rural
areas.
Beer retailers sell the beer to local populations. Beer is one of the few commodities that
is, at the same time, valuable and yet widely sold. One bottle of beer typically costs 1,500FC,
which is about US $1.10. Bottles are reused, and the value of the bottle itself is about ten times
the cost of a beer. While the urban retailers of Goma are often subject to informal taxation by
state officials, it is common for beer retailers in the rural areas to be sacked by roaming militia,
state soldiers, or robbed by a large number of roving bandits.
Because beer must be sourced from a small number of breweries, one of the primary decisions
facing beer retailers is how much inventory to stock. This decision involves a trade-off between
having more inventory, which reduces the risk of stock-outs, but increases the cost if stocks
are stolen. Smaller inventory increases the risk of stock-outs but reduces the expected losses
in the presence of weak property rights protection. Furthermore, beer sellers in rural areas
have very low capacity, and thus often have poor management practices. For example, when
the administrative firm-level data system was created, many beer sellers did not keep accurate
accounting.
The data set contains rural beer retailers who, since 2015, have been reporting information
daily. Each beer seller is from a randomly selected village within the area. Several aspects of beer
retailers make them a particularly well-suited population to study. First, since purchases of beer
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inventory can only be made from a limited number of retailers and only during a limited number
of points in time, unlike for retailers of other goods, for beer sellers managing the purchase of
inventories is a particularly important decision. Second, beer bottles are valuable and prone to
theft. This is much less true for other commonly sold commodities, which are not held in as
large of quantities and not as valuable. Thus, although there is nothing special about the use
of rituals and amulets by beer retailers, beer retailing offers a setting for which we can most
clearly identify a purpose for the rituals and amulets, and the plausible economic consequence
of them. Third, the different beer varieties sold are identical across beer sellers, which allows
for comparability across villages. Furthermore, most beer sellers sell predominantly the Primus
beer, which allows us to compare subjects of the experiment with minimal extrapolation issues
due to subject heterogeneity.
3.3 Intervention: The protection ritual
The protection and luck rituals that we provide are common in the region. However, the price
of such rituals ($40–50) means that they are out of reach for most individuals most of the time.
The average per capita GDP in the DRC is about $250. Thus, the price of protection is equal
to about 2–3 months’ worth of income.
In the survey we did to recruit beer sellers for this study, we asked them their maximum
willingness to pay for the anti-theft ritual that we later offered them for free.4 The average is
$40.
In March of 2015 and again in June of 2016, the authors traveled to the region and organized
a number of focus groups and pilot studies to gain the necessary background information about
these rituals. We found that protection rituals, in general, permeate all levels of society. Most
believe in their effectiveness, including those in the population who are university educated.
Although the finer details of protection spells vary from village to village, and even from
witchdoctor to witchdoctor, they do share common features. The spells require a ritual that
must be performed by someone with the knowledge and magical power necessary to endow such.
The rituals are performed in private. In addition, the protection spells require certain conditions
be met for the protection to continue working.
The intervention and data collection were approved by the Institutional Review Boards (IRB)
of Berkeley (Protocol: 2016-06-8849; FWA: 00006252), Chicago (Protocol: IRB20-0927), and
Harvard (Protocol: SITE18-0356; FWA: 00004837).
3.4 Measurement
To measure outcomes, we collected retail-level administrative data from 45 beer retailers from
the regions of Masisi, Rutshuru, and Walikale. In 2015, a team of surveyors visited a random
sample of villages in each region. In each village, if at least one beer retailer was present, then,
after obtaining consent, the beer retailer was given a smartphone and a solar charger. We
programmed an app so that the retailer could enter the details of his accounting every day. A
4Specifically, we asked Up to what amount would you be willing to pay for the anti-theft gri-gri?
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the end of each week, the retailer was given the necessary phone credit and transport money to
travel to the closest area with cellular coverage and upload the data from the previous week.
The retailers received extensive training over multiple days. We also set up a hotline where, if
there were technical issues with any of the equipment or software, the retailers could request a
local supervisor to fix the problem. Finally, the smartphone recorded the GPS location where
the data were entered.
To ensure data quality, the was specifically designed to be user friendly. Moreover, we
monitored and checked the data monthly to ensure accuracy. We reported missing data or
unusual entries to the specific beer seller’s local supervisor, who then contacted the beer seller.
The most common reason for missing entries was limited cell phone coverage which caused
difficulties in sending the recorded data. At the end of each month, after we verified the data,
beer sellers received a maximum wage of $30. Beer sellers were repeatedly informed that we
were doing our best using statistical techniques to detect whether the data were real.
The smartphone application contained the following information. First, the app requested,
for each variety, the prices and quantities of bottles sold on that day. Second, again for each
variety, the beer seller reported the prices and quantities of bottles purchased that day. Third,
the beer seller inspected his inventory and reported the number of bottles in stock each day.
Fourth, the beer seller recorded taxes paid, the occurrences of attacks, thefts, the number of
beers sold on credit, the running unpaid credits from sales, as well as other types of purchases
and investments made on the store.
Finally, using a similar smartphone application, a second individual in the village, the “in-
tellectual”, recorded contextual information about the village, in particular violent events and
theft.
Of the 45 retailers involved in the data collection, 41 initially agreed to participate in the
study. The four who did not participate did so because of their religious beliefs. Of the 41 beers
sellers, one beer seller changed his mind a few days after the date of his ritual was assigned.
Further, five retailers did not submit consistent or reliable data during the full period of the
analysis. Thus, removing these six retailers leaves us with a sample of 35 beer retailers attending
the rituals and for which we have data for the entire study period. Summary statistics for the
sample are reported in Table C.1.
3.5 Empirical strategy
We now turn to a description of our experimental design and our estimating equations.
3.5.1 Assignment to the intervention
Our study design is one where all participants receive treatment, but the order in which this is
done is randomized. Our sample of 35 beer sellers was treated over a period of approximately
thirty days from July 17th to August 13th 2017. Treatment occurred in cities in the three
regions represented in our sample.5 Each beer seller was given transport to the location of the
5The cities were Masisi Centre Kibabi, and Rubaya Centre in Masisi; Vitchumbi, Kanyabayonga, Rubare,
Kibirzi, and Kiwanja in Rutshuru; and Itebero, Makana, Ndjingala, and Walikale Centre in Walikale.
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Figure 3.2: Share of beer sellers that had received treatment by day.
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ritual the day before the ritual. The following day he received the ritual and then traveled back
to his village on the same or the following day. In each day, one beer seller was assigned to
receive treatment by the witchdoctor. Doing the rituals more frequently was not feasible since
it would have been too taxing on the witch doctor’s magic.
There was one exception to this rule when, related to the violations of treatment assignments,
one of the witchdoctors had to perform three rituals.
Figure 3.2 reports the fraction of all beer sellers that were treated in each day. As reported,
the assignment to treatment occurred smoothly during a one-month period. Treatment generally
occurred as planned. However, given the nature of the setting of the study and the resulting
logistical difficulties, there were some instances in which treatment did not occur during the
assigned treatment date. Violence and security concerns forced enumerators to deviate from
the randomized treatment assignment in some cases by a day or so – a full list of such cases is
documented in the paper’s appendix.
3.5.2 Estimating Equations
3.5.2.1 Waitlist Design
The set-up of the experiment, where all participants eventually receive treatment but at different
randomly-determined times, is commonly referred to as a waitlist design. It is common in the
medical field, where having a control group for which treatment is withheld is not possible for
ethical reasons. In this design, the probability of assignment to treatment varies from day to
day. The probability that an untreated retailer receives treatment is much higher during the
last days of the experiment than during the first days. Thus, to obtain unbiased estimates of
the average treatment effects, treated observations are weighted by the inverse probability of
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being assigned to the treatment group, and control observations are weighted by the inverse
probability of being assigned to the control group.
The equation that we estimate is given by:
Yit = αi + δw(t) + βDit + εit, (3.1)
where i denotes beer retailers, t denotes days from July 17th to August 13th, 2017, which is the
period during which treatment was occurring; during this time, there is always one beer seller
in the treatment group and one in the control group. Yit is an outcome of interest, Dit is an
indicator that equals one when beer seller i receives the ritual.6 αi denotes beer-retailer fixed
effects, which account for average differences across beer sellers. δw(t) denotes day-of-week fixed
effects and week-of-year fixed effects. The former capture average differences within a week. For
example, alcohol consumption may be higher on Sundays, a day when less work is done. The
latter capture average differences between weeks. For example, alcohol consumption may be
lower during the dry season.
3.5.2.2 Estimation Using Alternative Definitions of Treatment
As we have noted, in some cases, the actual day of treatment deviated from the randomized day
of treatment, due to delays in implementation that arose due to logistical and security issues.
Given this, we also report estimates where instead of using Dit as our treatment measure, we
use a treatment measure that is based on assignment to treatment (and not actual receipt of
treatment). We refer to this as our ITT estimate. We denote this variable Tit. We also report
estimates where we use treatment assignment Tit as an instrument for actual treatment Dit.
3.5.2.3 Allowing for a Differential Effect Following a Post-Ritual Theft
It is possible that the effects of the ritual on our outcomes of interest are very different if a
retailer is robbed. If a theft occurs, this will likely cause the retailer to question the validity
of the perceived protection, weakening its effects. We test for this by adding the following
additional interaction term to our estimating equations: Dit × Post Theftit, where Dit is the
post-ritual indicator and Post Theftit is an indicator variable that equals one following a theft.
The interaction between the two is equivalent to an indicator variable that equals one following
a post-ritual theft.
3.5.2.4 Estimation of an Effect on Sale Prices
Any effect on revenues may be due to a change in quantities sold or in sale prices. The data
set contains several brands of beer and other beverages. Some of the brands are typically more
expensive than others. To test for effects on sale prices in a single regression, it is thus necessary
to modify the data set and the estimating equation. We expand the data set such that an
observation is a beer brand by beer seller by day, and we add beer brand fixed effects to our
estimating equation.
6Results are unchanged when we drop the day on which the ritual took place from the analysis.
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3.6 Results
We now turn to our estimated effects of the ritual treatment on the behavior of beer sellers.
The first outcome that we examine is whether beer sellers perceived that they were protected
by a ritual. This step can be viewed as a zero-stage estimate or a check on the validity of our
treatment.
There are many reasons that people may not believe they are protected despite undergoing
a protection ritual. For example, they may not believe that the witchdoctor was legitimate.
Alternatively, they could believe in the ritual but were not able to follow the conditions necessary
for it to remain in effect.
Given our interest in the effects of the ritual on those who believe in witchcraft, we partition
our sample into two groups: believers and non-believers, as revealed by the data. Specifically,
we define a beer-seller as non-believer if they report never being protected even after receiving
the protection ritual. In total, this is true for 10 of the 35 beer sellers. Thus, 25 beer sellers
report being protected for at least one day in the sample period.
The effectiveness of the ritual for the sample of 25 beer sellers is summarized in Figure 3.3,
which reports the fraction of beer sellers that report having some form of magical protection
in use in each day. The days are measured as days before actual treatment and days after
treatment.7 A number of facts are apparent from Figure 3.3. First, prior to treatment, some
beer sellers (about 15% on average) did have their own magical protection. Second, there is
a noticeable increase in the proportion of beer sellers that were protected following treatment.
Third, there is some evidence that, following the ritual, the perceived protection wears off. One
7The same figure but using the assignment to treatment rather than actual treatment is reported in Appendix
Figure C.1.
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reason why this could occur, and one that we will test for explicitly, is that if theft occurs
following a ritual, then a retailer may question the validity of the ritual, perhaps believing that
the spell has worn off because they have not correctly followed the conditions. Thus, the effects
of a ritual may be very different if theft occurs. We return to this below.
3.6.1 Effect of the ritual on business outcomes
We begin by first reporting our waitlist design estimates. Panel A of Table 3.1 reports our base-
line ITT estimates. We report coefficients, standardized ‘beta’ coefficients in italics, and p-values
from randomization inference in square brackets. The odd-numbered columns report estimates
with without day-of-week and week-of-year fixed effects and the even-numbered columns with
day-of-week and week-of-year fixed effects.
In columns 1 and 2, we report estimates of the effects of the ritual on daily revenues. We find
a large and statistically significant positive effect. Beer sellers make roughly $3 more revenue
each day on average after the ritual. We disaggregate this estimated revenue effect into prices
and quantities by separately examining the number of bottles sold (columns 3 and 4), and the
average unit price of bottles sold (columns 5 and 6). We find that the increase in revenues is
due to increased sales and not prices. This is reassuring since market prices fluctuate very little
and that the vendors tend to be price takers. If we saw large effects working through prices, we
might be worried that optimistic reporting, influenced by the ritual treatment, may be driving
some of the results.
In Panel B of Table 3.1, we report estimates that allow for a differential effect of treatment
in the days that follow a robbery. If a beer seller, who perceives himself to be protected, is stolen
from, this may cause him to question the protection. Alternatively, he may believe that this is
proof that he has not followed the necessary conditions correctly. Thus, Panel B in Table 3.1
reports estimates identical to Panel A except that we allow the estimated effect of the ritual to
differ in the days following a theft. The effects that we estimate for revenues and quantities are
entirely reversed (and even more so) following a theft. The effect of rituals following a post-ritual
theft can be obtained by summing the two estimated effects.8
While the beer-sellers’ primary sales item is beer, they also stock and sell local soft drinks.
The estimates reported to this point have included all beverages together. We now check the
robustness of our estimates to distinguishing between beer and soft drinks. Ex ante, we do not
have any reason to expect that one would be affected more than another. Both beverages are
valuable and can be stolen. The estimates, which are reported in Table C.3, show that we obtain
very similar estimates for soft drinks and for beer. The magnitude of the estimated effects is
similar for the number of bottles sold, while the revenue effects are larger for beer, which is
expected given that the price per bottle is higher (roughly $1.80 versus $0.90)
To assess whether the ritual is a profitable investment, we compare the extra profit beer
sellers make from increased sales to the cost of the ritual. Within the period we study in the
waitlist design, beer sellers make, on average, roughly $1 more profit each day after the ritual
($3 from increased sales minus $2 cost of goods sold). Thus, the average increase in profits is $14
8We find the same result when including theft incidences that took place one or two weeks after the period we
study in the waitlist design: a theft exactly reverses the effects of the ritual.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Baseline
Intent-to-treat 3.018 3.829 1.899 2.809 0.025 −0.012
Beta coefficient 0.069 0.088 0.049 0.073 0.022 −0.011
IV 3.213 4.253 2.021 3.120 0.029 −0.016
p value for no effect 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.936 0.941
Panel B. Post-Treatment Theft
Intent-to-treat 3.556 3.597 2.433 2.585 0.019 −0.009
Beta coefficient 0.081 0.082 0.063 0.067 0.016 −0.007
IV 3.793 3.997 2.596 2.872 0.021 −0.011
p value for no effect 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.902 0.895
Post-treatment theft (ITT) −6.455 −7.029 −6.412 −6.809 0.066 0.052
Beta coefficient −0.097 −0.105 −0.109 −0.115 0.037 0.029
Post-treatment theft (IV) −6.539 −6.976 −6.470 −6.771 0.066 0.051
p value for no effect 0.133 0.129 0.106 0.084 0.222 0.138
Beer seller fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Beer brand fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Week-of-year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Day-of-week fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean (std. dev.) dep. var. 14.34 (21.88) 11.82 (19.37) 1.23 (0.59)
Observations 645 645 645 645 3,157 3,157
Notes: This table presents intent-to-treat and IV estimates of the effects of the ritual on
business outcomes. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is revenues (converted
to USD); in columns 3 and 4, it is number of bottles sold; in columns 5 and 6, it is
sale prices (converted to USD). In columns 1 to 4, the unit of observation is beer seller
by day; in columns 5 and 6, it is beer brand by beer seller by day. All regressions
include beer seller fixed effects. Columns 2, 4, and 6 add day-of-week and week-of-year
fixed effects; and columns 5 and 6 also include brand fixed effects. For each regression,
intent-to-treat coefficients, beta coefficients of the ITT, IV coefficients, and p-values for
no effect (in italics) are reported. p-values are computed using randomization inference
with 10,000 reassignments of treatment status. All regressions are weighted by the
inverse probability of being treated.
60 Traditional Belief Systems and Economic Behavior
within these two weeks. Looking beyond the period of the waitlist design, the average increase
in profits is $40 after one month and $61 after two months. On the other hand, the market price
for a ritual is around $50. Thus, our findings suggest that investment in a ritual roughly breaks
even.
3.6.2 Understanding Mechanisms
Our findings of increased sales and revenues raise the natural question of why. To dig deeper
into the reason behind this effect, we next estimate the effects of the protection rituals on
mechanisms that could explain the increase in sales and revenues. Specifically, we test whether
the rituals affected purchases of new bottles and the incidence of stock-outs, defined as zero total
inventories at any point in a day. If the ritual affected the beer seller’s perceived probability of
being robbed, this may have affected the stock of inventories that sellers felt was safe to hold,
which, in turn, could affect the frequency of stock-outs.
The estimated effects of the protection ritual on the two outcomes are reported in columns
1–4 of Table ??. We find a sizeable positive effect of the ritual on purchases of new bottles
and a negative effect on stock-outs. While the magnitudes for both sets of estimates is large,
the precision of the estimates for purchases is much greater than for stock-outs. This is likely
due to the infrequency of stock-outs in our sample. There is only a 5.43% chance that a beer
seller will experience a stock-during during a day. The coefficients estimated for the stock-out
effects are large; they imply that the ritual reduced the occurrence of stock-outs by about 5
percentage points. This is a very large effect, especially when compared to the mean occurrence
of stock-outs in the sample, which is 5.43%.
We also allow these estimated effects to differ following a post-ritual theft. These estimates
are reported in columns 1–4 of Table 3.2 Panel B. As with sales and revenues, we see that the
effects of the ritual are completely reversed if theft occurs following a ritual.
The last outcome that we examine is the closing time, measured as a variable that ranges
from 4 (4am) to 27 (3am). A priori, it is possible that due to the ritual, sellers feel that they
can leave their shops open later. If so, this would also potentially account for the greater sales.
Another possibility is that beer sellers engage in daily income targets and close their shop if such
a target is reached. Such behavior is common in the DRC. For example, this is a well-known
strategy practice by drivers of motorcycle taxis. If this is the case, then the increased sales and
revenues due to the protection spell may cause sellers to close earlier.
The estimates of the effect of the ritual on shop closing times are reported in columns 5
and 6 of Table 3.2. Interestingly, we find evidence that the ritual causes beer sellers to close
their shops earlier, which is consistent with daily income targeting. The estimated coefficients,
although imprecisely estimated, are negative. The estimates allowing for a differential effect of
following a post-ritual theft are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.2 Panel B. Interestingly,
we do not see the same reverse of the hours-opening effect following a post-ritual theft. In fact,
we estimate an intensification effect following a theft after a ritual that is statistically significant.
That is, following a post-ritual theft, beer sellers tend to close their shop even earlier. However,
one caveat for all of these estimates is that they are small in magnitude. The estimated effects
range from 6–15 minutes.
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Stock-out indicator Closing time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Baseline
Intent-to-treat 3.891 11.282 −0.051 −0.037 −0.156 −0.087
Beta coefficient 0.023 0.068 −0.112 −0.081 −0.057 −0.031
IV 4.143 12.531 −0.054 −0.041 −0.167 −0.097
p value for no effect 0.023 0.044 0.288 0.353 0.160 0.104
Panel B. Post-Treatment Theft
Intent-to-treat 4.446 11.115 −0.058 −0.033 −0.138 −0.092
Beta coefficient 0.027 0.067 −0.129 −0.073 −0.050 −0.033
IV 4.743 12.351 −0.062 −0.037 −0.147 −0.102
p value for no effect 0.023 0.046 0.224 0.384 0.376 0.091
Post-treatment theft (ITT) −6.650 −5.072 0.091 0.117 −0.224 −0.140
Beta coefficient −0.026 −0.020 0.132 0.169 −0.053 −0.033
Post-treatment theft (IV) −6.755 −4.909 0.093 0.116 −0.221 −0.141
p value for no effect 0.038 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Beer seller fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Day-of-week fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean (std. dev.) dep. var. 15.76 (82.98) 0.05 (0.23) 20.28 (1.38)
Observations 645 645 645 645 639 639
Notes: This table presents intent-to-treat and IV estimates of the effects of the ritual on
purchases, stock-outs and closing times. The unit of observation is beer seller by day. The
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is number of bottles purchased; in columns 3 and
4, it is an indicator variable that equals one if beer sellers stock was zero; in columns 5
and 6, it is the time when beer sellers closed the shop. All regressions include beer seller
fixed effects. Columns 2, 4, and 6 add day-of-week and week-of-year fixed effects. For each
regression, intent-to-treat coefficients, beta coefficients of the ITT, IV coefficients, and p-
values for no effect (in italics) are reported. p-values are computed using randomization
inference with 10,000 reassignments of treatment status. All regressions are weighted by
the inverse probability of being treated.
62 Traditional Belief Systems and Economic Behavior
We next turn to the question of what mechanisms explain higher purchases and lower stock-
outs. We do this by studying the potential effects of the ritual on deeper mechanisms like the
beliefs, expectations, and psychology of beer sellers. The first that we consider are people’s
beliefs about the extent to which they are protected. This is measured using a question that
asks: “Do you have any fetish in use today?” and they choose “yes” or “no”. The estimates,
reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.3 show that, indeed, people do feel more protected
following the ritual and that this feeling is partially reversed following a theft. Next, we look
more specifically at their perceived expectation that they will be robbed. This is measured
using a question that asks: “Do you think someone will steal from you next week” and they
choose “yes” or “no”. Estimates with an indicator that equals one if the retailer answered “yes”
are reported in columns 3 and 4. Consistent with beer sellers feeling more protected, we find
that the ritual lowers their expectation of being robbed. The effect is sizable – reducing theft
expectations by about 9 percentage points on average – and the estimated effects is statistically
significant at conventional levels. Interestingly, we find no evidence that this belief is reversed
following a post-ritual robbery (Panel B). In columns 5 and 6, for completeness, we also report
the estimated effects of the ritual on actual theft. This provides a placebo test (assuming the
ritual does not really work). It is also useful as evidence for whether there are experimenter
demand effects, which generate reporting bias. If so, we might expect individuals to be less
likely to report actual thefts that occur so as not to disappoint us. Reassuringly, we find no
evidence that the ritual affects the actual incidence of theft.
We also examine the effects of the ritual on a self-reported measure of stress. Respondents
are asked “What is your stress level today”. They then rate their stress level from 0 (no stress)
to 10 (high stress). Estimates with this outcome are reported in columns 7 and 8 of Table 3.3.
In contrast to previous findings in the literature, we find no evidence that the rituals helped to
reduce self-reported stress. The estimates are highly insignificant and very small in magnitude.
This is potentially explained by the fact that the reported values of stress are quite low. The
mean value reported is only 1.42.
3.6.3 Non compliers as a control
For completeness, and as a check on the sensibility of our estimates, we also report the same
regression estimates, but for the ten retailers who we infer do not believe in traditional magic.
These are those who never report (neither before nor after treatment) being protected by magic.
The estimates, which are reported in Appendix Tables C.4–C.6, show that we do not find the
same effect of treatment as we do with the other retailers. Specifically, we find no effects on
sales revenues, quantities sold, inventories, stock-outs, or expectations of theft.
Chapter 3 63






Theft indicator Stress level [0-10]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Baseline
Intent-to-treat 0.687 0.651 −0.087 −0.077 −0.001 0.005 0.050 0.065
Beta coefficient 0.693 0.657 −0.127 −0.112 −0.004 0.019 0.010 0.013
IV 0.731 0.723 −0.093 −0.085 −0.001 0.006 0.053 0.072
p value for no effect 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.043 0.650 0.342 0.267 0.304
Panel B. Post-Treatment Theft
Intent-to-treat 0.707 0.641 −0.079 −0.080 0.036 0.074
Beta coefficient 0.713 0.647 −0.116 −0.117 0.007 0.015
IV 0.754 0.713 −0.084 −0.089 0.038 0.082
p value for no effect 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.034 0.198 0.280
Post-treatment theft (ITT) −0.237 −0.294 −0.095 −0.094 0.165 0.269
Beta coefficient −0.157 −0.195 −0.091 −0.091 0.022 0.036
Post-treatment theft (IV) −0.254 −0.285 −0.093 −0.096 0.164 0.271
p value for no effect 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.966
Beer seller fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Day-of-week fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean (std. dev.) dep. var. 0.43 (0.50) 0.13 (0.34) 0.02 (0.14) 1.42 (2.47)
Observations 645 645 645 645 645 645 645 645
Notes: This table presents intent-to-treat and IV estimates of the effects of the ritual on perceptions,
theft expectations, actual theft, and perceived stress. The unit of observation is beer seller by day. The
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is an indicator variable equal to one if beer seller feels protected from
theft; in columns 3 and 4, it is an indicator variable equal to one if beer seller expects a theft incidence in
the following week; in columns 5 and 6, it is an indicator variable equal to one if retailer experienced a theft
incidence during the day; and in columns 7 and 8, it is self-reported stress level. All regressions include
beer seller fixed effects. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 add day-of-week and week-of-year fixed effects. For each
regression, intent-to-treat coefficients, beta coefficients of the ITT, IV coefficients, and p-values for no effect
(in italics) are reported. p-values are computed using randomization inference with 10,000 reassignments
of treatment status. All regressions are weighted by the inverse probability of being treated.
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3.7 Conclusion
Traditional religious beliefs, such beliefs in ancestors, supernatural powers, and witchcraft, ap-
pear to be widespread in sub-Saharan Africa. Within anthropology, they are well-recognized
and widely studied. They are described as permeating all aspects of daily life. Survey data
indicate that the majority of the population of sub-Saharan Africa hold these traditional beliefs.
Despite this, within economics, these beliefs have not been incorporated into our understanding
of human behavior, whether it be in the social or economic sphere. One reason for this is that
from the existing evidence, it is far from clear how strongly held these beliefs are and whether
they actually affect human actions, particularly in the economic sphere.
In this study, we have made progress on this issue by estimating the effects of a common anti-
theft ritual among a random sample of beer retailers in the Eastern DRC. The study provided a
protection ritual to the retailers at different points in time that are randomly chosen. Observing
daily economic behavior and reported beliefs before and after participation in the ritual, we
found that ten of the 35 retailers did not believe in the efficacy of the ritual they undertook.
This proportion is roughly consistent with the prevalence of witchcraft beliefs in the region
70-80%.
We found that, among believers, participation in the ritual had noticeable effects on beliefs
and economic behavior. In the weeks following the ritual, the retailers believed that the ritual
was working, perceived a lower probability of theft, held larger stocks of inventory, had fewer
stock-outs, and had higher revenues and profits. We did not observe the effects among the
retailers who report not believing in the efficacy fo the ritual.
Thus, our findings showed that these beliefs are strongly held and enough so to affect eco-
nomic behavior within our sample of retailers. This insight is particularly important given
the reported prevalence of traditional religious beliefs and their persistence, in spite of the
widespread adoption of Christianity and Islam on the continent. Such beliefs are real and do
affect decisions and outcomes that are relevant for economic development. The findings here
point to the importance of additional research aimed at understanding these beliefs and their
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Figure A.1: Country-level drought intensity exposure among WVS countries over years
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Figure A.2: Country-level earthquake exposure among WVS countries over years
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Figure A.3: Country-level hurricane exposure among WVS countries over years
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Figure A.4: Economic disaster exposure among WVS countries over years
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Table A.1: Robustness: restricting sample to native-born respondents
Importance of norm conformity [std.]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Drought experience [std.] −0.004
(0.032)
Drought experience × High agriculture [std.] 0.032
(0.025)
Earthquake experience [std.] 0.021
(0.035)
Hurricane experience [std.] 0.053
(0.042)
Economic disaster experience [std.] 0.074∗∗∗
(0.024)
No. of countries 52 53 45 22
Country × survey-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort, age, gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 57,258 58,186 42,120 27,561
R2 0.090 0.090 0.095 0.078
Notes: OLS estimates, robust standard errors are clustered at the country-cohort level
and reported in parentheses. An observation is an individual. The outcome in all
columns is self-reported importance of norm conformity. The main independent vari-
ables are lifetime experience of drought intensity interacted with an indicator equal to
one if the average share of employment in agriculture in years 2000 - 2005 is greater
than 25%, lifetime experience of significant earthquakes, lifetime experience of hurri-
canes, and lifetime experience of economic disasters. The data sources of the natural
and economic disasters and the measurement of lifetime experience are described in
the text. All regressions include fixed effects for country of current residence × sur-
vey year, birth cohort, age, and gender. Other individual controls include a dummy
equal to one if the respondent is unemployed and fixed effects for highest educational
attainment. All variables are standardized to z-scores. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and
* p < 0.1.
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
Figure B.1: Populist Party’s vote shares across counties in the 1892 presidential election
Notes: This map shows the county-level vote share for the Populist Party in the 1892 presidential election in the
U.S. South. Darker greens indicate higher vote shares.
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Figure B.2: Distribution of Populist Party’s vote share in the 1892 presidential election
Notes: The graph shows the distribution of the Populist Party’s vote share in the presidential election of 1892 in
the U.S. South.
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Figure B.3: Distribution of the political threat dummy
Notes: The graph shows the Southern United States in the borders of 1890. Counties in dark or light grey have
newspapers in the database and are part of the analysis. Dark (light) grey indicates that the Populist party won
some (no) vote share in the 1892 presidential elections.
78 Appendix to Chapter 2
Figure B.4: Distribution of the alternative political threat dummy
Notes: The graph shows the Southern United States in the borders of 1890. Counties in dark or light grey have
newspapers in the database and are part of the analysis. Dark (light) grey indicates that the Populist party won
a vote share higher (smaller) than 10% in the 1892 presidential elections.
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Figure B.5: Illustration of newspaper articles associating African Americans with rapes
Notes: Top panel: Public Ledger, Memphis. Bottom panel: Eufaula Daily Times, 1893
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Table B.1: Summary statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Anti-Black propaganda 8,086 1.002 1.437 0 22
Political threat indicator 8,086 0.832 0.374 0 1
Post 1892 indicator 8,086 0.597 0.491 0 1
Log population 7,947 10.726 0.595 7.437 13.090
Share black population 7,947 0.397 0.231 0.002 0.934
Residentail segregation 7,790 0.342 0.121 −0.002 0.708
Avg. log p.c. manuf. output 7,782 3.505 1.401 0.000 6.447
Avg. log p.c. farm output 7,947 4.225 0.672 1.074 5.609
Avg. farm size 7,947 144.390 505.320 38 25,576
Rail miles / county sq. miles 7,947 0.526 0.323 0.000 1.877
Avg. indebtedness of farms 7,839 0.447 0.136 0.100 1.000
Avg. interest rate on farm mortgages 7,839 3.650 1.299 0.778 8.221
Share cotton acerage 7,936 0.095 0.094 0.000 0.459
Share share-cropping farms 7,947 0.241 0.131 0.000 0.795
Democrat vote share 1892 8,086 59.563 17.081 21.100 100.000
Democrat newspaper indicator 6,051 0.830 0.376 0.000 1.000
Table B.2: Robustness: Political threat if Populist vote share is great than 10%
Anti-black propaganda [std.]
All Non Dem. Democratic Newspapers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.124∗∗∗ −0.006 0.134∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(0.038) (0.085) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042)
No. of newspapers 764 110 654 654 654
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic conditions × year FE No No No Yes Yes
Dem. vote share × year FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5,399 666 4,733 4,733 4,733
R2 0.503 0.602 0.497 0.525 0.530
Notes: The table shows that the main result replicates if we define political threat as an
indicator equal to one if the Populist Party gained more than 10% of the vote share in the
newspaper’s county in the presidential election of 1892. An observation is a newspaper-year
from 1885 to 1903. The outcome in each column is anti-Black propaganda in newspapers.
All regressions include newspaper and year × census region fixed effects. Column 1 shows
the estimate for the full sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to newspapers that do
not endorse the Democratic Party. Column 3 to 5 restricts the sample to newspapers that
endorse the Democratic Party or for which this information is not available. Column 4
adds controls for county-level economic conditions in 1890, interacted with year dummies.
These controls are described in Table 1. Column 5 adds controls for the vote shares for
the Democratic Party in the 1892 presidential election, interacted with year dummies. All
variables are standardized to z-scores. The standard errors are clustered on counties and
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels.
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Table B.3: Robustness: Political threat dummy and Populist vote share.
Anti-black propaganda [std.]
All Non Dem. Democratic Newspapers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.127∗∗∗ −0.016 0.149∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.107) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054)
Populist vote share × Post 1892 [std.] 0.063 0.054 0.058 0.057 0.014
(0.048) (0.135) (0.051) (0.051) (0.055)
No. of newspapers 764 110 654 654 654
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic conditions × year FE No No No Yes Yes
Dem. vote share × year FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5,399 666 4,733 4,733 4,733
R2 0.502 0.602 0.496 0.526 0.530
Notes: The table shows that the main result replicates if we add the vote share for the Populist
Party in the presidential election of 1892 to the regression. An observation is a newspaper-year
from 1885 to 1903. The outcome in each column is anti-Black propaganda in newspapers. The
main independent variable is an indicator equal to one if the Populist Party gained votes in
the presidential election of 1892 in the newspaper’s county (first difference) interacted with an
indicator equal to one for years greater than 1892 (second difference). All regressions include
newspaper and year-census region fixed effects. Column 1 shows the estimate for the full sample.
Column 2 restricts the sample to newspapers that do not endorse the Democratic Party Column
3 to 5 focus on newspapers that endorse the Democratic Party of for which this information is
not available. Column 4 adds county-level economic controls, measured in 1890, and interacted
with year dummies. These controls are described in Table 1. Column 5 adds controls for the
vote shares for the Democratic Party in the 1892 presidential election, interacted with year
dummies. All variables are standardized to z-scores. The standard errors are clustered on
counties and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 %
levels.
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Table B.4: Robustness: Quintiles of Populist vote share
Anti-black propaganda [std.]
All Non Dem. Democratic Newspapers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2nd quintile Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.013 −0.097 0.027 0.056 0.049
(0.042) (0.072) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041)
3rd quintile Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.107∗∗∗ 0.047 0.118∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.079) (0.032) (0.035) (0.036)
4th quintile Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.158∗∗∗ 0.011 0.178∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.066) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042)
5th quintile Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.140∗∗∗ −0.013 0.161∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.075) (0.049) (0.053) (0.059)
No. of newspapers 764 110 654 654 654
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic conditions × year FE No No No Yes Yes
Dem. vote share × year FE No No No No Yes
Observations 5,399 666 4,733 4,733 4,733
R2 0.504 0.604 0.499 0.527 0.531
Notes: The table shows that the main result replicates for the upper quintiles of the Populist Party vote
share in the presidential election of 1892. An observation is a newspaper-year from 1885 to 1903. The
outcome in each column is anti-Black propaganda in newspapers. The main independent variables are
indicators equal to one for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintile of the vote share for Populist Party in
the newspaper’s county in the presidential election of 1892 (first difference) interacted with an indicator
equal to one for years greater than 1892 (second difference). All regressions include newspaper and year
× census region fixed effects. Column 1 shows the estimate for the full sample. Column 2 restricts the
sample to newspapers that do not endorse the Democratic Party. Column 3 to 5 restricts the sample to
newspapers that endorse the Democratic Party or for which this information is not available. Column
4 adds controls for county-level economic conditions in 1890, interacted with year dummies. These
controls are described in Table 1. Column 5 adds controls for the vote shares for the Democratic Party
in the presidential elections of 1892, interacted with year dummies. All variables are standardized to
z-scores. The standard errors are clustered on counties and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels.
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Table B.5: Robustness: Balanced panel.
Anti-black propaganda [std.]
All Democratic Newspapers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.156∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.071) (0.089) (0.088)
No. of newspapers 60 54 54 54
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No
Economic conditions × year FE No No Yes Yes
Dem. vote share × year FE No No No Yes
Observations 5,399 1,026 1,026 1,026
R2 0.502 0.529 0.621 0.637
Notes: The table shows that the main result replicates if we restrict the sample
to the balanced panel. An observation is a newspaper-year from 1885 to 1903.
The outcome in each column is anti-Black propaganda. The main independent
variable is an indicator equal to one if the Populist Party gained votes in
the newspaper’s county in the presidential election of 1892 (first difference)
interacted with an indicator equal to one for years greater than 1892 (second
difference). All regressions include newspaper and year × census region fixed
effects. Column 1 shows the estimate for the full sample. Column 2 to 4 focus
on newspapers that endorse the Democratic Party of for which this information
is not available. Column 3 adds controls for county-level economic conditions
in 1890, interacted with year dummies. These controls are described in Table
1. Column 4 adds controls for the vote shares for the Democratic Party in the
presidential elections of 1892, interacted with year dummies. All variables are
standardized to z-scores. The standard errors are clustered on counties and
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 %
levels.
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Table B.6: Robustness: Dropping newspapers in Louisiana
Anti-black propaganda [std.]
All Non Dem. Democratic Newspapers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] 0.156∗∗∗ 0.033 0.178∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗
(0.046) (0.095) (0.052) (0.052) (0.058)
No. of newspapers 710 104 606 606 606
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic conditions × year FE No No No Yes Yes
Dem. vote share × year FE No No No No Yes
Observations 4,914 615 4,299 4,299 4,299
R2 0.508 0.613 0.501 0.533 0.537
Notes: The table shows that the main result replicates if we drop newspapers from
Louisiana. An observation is a newspaper-year from 1885 to 1903. The outcome in each
column is anti-Black propaganda in newspapers. The main independent variable is an in-
dicator equal to one if the Populist Party gained votes in the presidential election of 1892
in the newspaper’s county (first difference) interacted with an indicator equal to one for
years greater than 1892 (second difference). All regressions include newspaper and year ×
census region fixed effects. Column 1 shows the estimate for the full sample. Column 2
restricts the sample to newspapers that do not endorse the Democratic Party Column 3 to
5 focus on newspapers that endorse the Democratic Party of for which this information is
not available. Column 4 adds county-level economic controls, measured in 1890, and inter-
acted with year dummies. These controls are described in Table 1. Column 5 adds controls
for the vote shares for the Democratic Party in the 1892 presidential election, interacted
with year dummies. All variables are standardized to z-scores. The standard errors are
clustered on counties and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
1, 5, and 10 % levels.
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Table B.7: Placebo test: political threat and rape unrelated to African Americans
White rape terminology [std.]
All Non Dem. Democratic Newspapers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Political threat × Post 1892 [std.] −0.034 −0.045 −0.026 −0.010 −0.049
(0.053) (0.218) (0.056) (0.057) (0.066)
No. of newspapers 764 110 654 654 654
Newspaper FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No
Region-year FE No No No Yes Yes
Economic conditions × year FE No No No No Yes
Dem. vote share × year FE No No No No No
Observations 5,387 666 4,721 4,721 4,721
R2 0.316 0.379 0.315 0.352 0.357
Notes: The table shows that political threat due to the rise of the Populist Party
does not affect the frequency of rape terminology unrelated to African Americans.
An observation is a newspaper-year from 1885 to 1903. The outcome in each column
is the frequency of rape terminology in newspapers, net of anti-Black propaganda in
newspapers. The main independent variable is an indicator equal to one if the Populist
Party gained votes in the newspaper’s county in the presidential election of 1892 (first
difference) interacted with an indicator equal to one for years greater than 1892 (second
difference). All regressions include newspaper and year × census region fixed effects.
Column 1 shows the estimate for the full sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to
newspapers that do not endorse the Democratic Party. Column 3 to 5 restricts the
sample to newspapers that endorse the Democratic Party. Column 4 adds controls
for county-level economic conditions in 1890, interacted with year dummies. These
controls are described in Table 1. Column 5 adds controls for the vote shares for the
Democratic Party in the 1892 presidential election, interacted with year dummies. All
variables are standardized to z-scores. The standard errors are clustered on counties
and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 %
levels.
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Figure C.2: Response rate around treatment
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Table C.1: Summary statistics of main variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Ritual assigned 918 0.492 0.500 0 1
Ritual received 918 0.495 0.500 0 1
Revenues (USD) 918 18.240 27.322 0 295.996
Number of bottles sold 918 14.125 21.769 0 215
Number of bottles purchased 918 18.219 80.883 0 1,380
Stock-out indicator 918 0.046 0.209 0 1
Closing time 908 20.393 1.343 16.050 25.067
Feeling protected indicator 910 0.322 0.467 0 1
Theft expectation indicator 918 0.101 0.302 0 1
Theft indicator 918 0.020 0.139 0 1
Stress level 918 1.408 2.480 0 10
Post-treatment-theft indicator 918 0.093 0.290 0 1
Sale Prices (USD) 3,157 1.232 0.585 0.233 3.333
Notes: The sample covers 27 days from July 17th to August 13th, 2017 for 35 beer
retailers who report consistent data during the sample period. Ritual assigned
takes value 1 during days on and following the ritual assignment, 0 otherwise.
Ritual received takes value 1 during days on and following the ritual actually
received, 0 otherwise. Stock-out indicator takes value 1 if the inventory reaches
zero during the day, 0 otherwise. Closing time is the hour of the day beer sellers
close the shop, where we recode past midnight hours such that increasing values
indicate later closing hours (i.e., 1am becomes 25). Feeling protected indicator
takes value 1 during days when retailers indicate the magical protection works,
0 otherwise. Theft expectation indicator takes value 1 during days when beer
sellers expect a theft incident during the next seven days, 0 otherwise. Theft
indicator takes value 1 during days when someone stole inventory from beer sellers,
0 otherwise. Stress level is self-reported, ranging from 0 to 10, with increasing
values indicating higher stress level. Post-treatment theft takes value 1 during
days following a theft incidence after beer sellers received the ritual, 0 otherwise.
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Table C.2: pre-determined characteristics
Pre-study outcome Mean Estimate Std. error p-value
Male 0.854 0.252 0.219 0.250
Revenues (USD) 13.328 -14.716 8.236 0.074
Number of bottles sold 11.353 -10.770 6.866 0.117
Number of bottles purchased 9.608 -9.751 6.831 0.154
Stock-out indicator 0.050 0.037 0.045 0.406
Closing time 20.350 -0.176 0.436 0.687
Theft expectation indicator 0.016 -0.003 0.013 0.792
Theft indicator 0.074 0.078 0.056 0.166
Stress level 1.643 1.241 0.713 0.082
Notes: The table presents coefficients for 9 OLS regressions of pre-
determined characteristics on an indicator equal to one if the beer retailer
reports being protected for at least one day in the sample period. The
characteristics include beer sellers’ gender and the outcome variables of
the analysis but measured between June 1st to July 15th, 2017, before
our sampling period for the main analysis. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the beer retailer level. The F statistic of the null
hypothesis that all independent variables of a regression of the indicator
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intent-to-treat −11.251 −8.433 −8.844 −6.596 0.047 0.005
Beta coefficient −0.165 −0.124 −0.178 −0.133 0.043 0.004
IV −11.305 −9.306 −8.887 −7.279 0.047 0.005
p value for no effect 0.311 0.327 0.299 0.326 0.576 0.579
Beer seller fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Beer brand fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Week-of-year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Day-of-week fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean (std. dev.) dep. var. 26.88 (34.05) 19.04 (24.82) 1.33 (0.54)
Observations 136 136 136 136 498 498
Notes: This table presents intent-to-treat and IV estimates of the effects of the ritual on
business outcomes for the sample of non-believing beer sellers. The dependent variable
in columns 1 and 2 is revenues (converted to USD); in columns 3 and 4, it is number
of bottles sold; in columns 5 and 6, it is sale prices (converted to USD). In columns 1
to 4, the unit of observation is beer seller by day; in columns 5 and 6, it is beer brand
by beer seller by day. All regressions include beer seller fixed effects. Columns 2, 4,
and 6 add day-of-week and week-of-year fixed effects; and columns 5 and 6 also include
brand fixed effects. For each regression, intent-to-treat coefficients, beta coefficients of
the ITT, IV coefficients, and p-values for no effect (in italics) are reported. p-values are
computed using randomization inference with 10,000 reassignments of treatment status.
All regressions are weighted by the inverse probability of being treated.
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Table C.5: Placebo results for non-believer sample: purchases, stock-outs, and closing times
Number of bottles
purchased
Stock-out indicator Closing time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intent-to-treat −36.581 −15.851 0.002 −0.018 0.009 −0.070
Beta coefficient −0.234 −0.101 0.006 −0.060 0.004 −0.029
IV −36.758 −17.491 0.002 −0.020 0.009 −0.078
p value for no effect 0.028 0.036 0.633 0.302 0.686 0.287
Beer seller fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Day-of-week fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean (std. dev.) dep. var. 23.46 (78.19) 0.02 (0.15) 20.65 (1.23)
Observations 136 136 136 136 134 134
Notes: This table presents intent-to-treat and IV estimates of the effects of the ritual
on purchases, stock-outs and closing times for the sample of non-believing beer sellers.
The unit of observation is beer seller by day. The dependent variable in columns 1 and
2 is number of bottles purchased; in columns 3 and 4, it is an indicator variable that
equals one if beer sellers stock was zero; in columns 5 and 6, it is the time when beer
sellers closed the shop. All regressions include beer seller fixed effects. Columns 2, 4,
and 6 add day-of-week and week-of-year fixed effects. For each regression, intent-to-treat
coefficients, beta coefficients of the ITT, IV coefficients, and p-values for no effect (in
italics) are reported. p-values are computed using randomization inference with 10,000
reassignments of treatment status. All regressions are weighted by the inverse probability
of being treated.
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Theft indicator Stress level [0-10]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intent-to-treat 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.051 0.000 0.009 0.291 0.517
Beta coefficient 0.000 0.000 0.273 0.299 −0.000 0.037 0.056 0.100
IV 0.047 0.057 0.000 0.010 0.293 0.570
p value for no effect 1.000 1.000 0.108 0.091 0.941 0.251 0.254 0.212
Beer seller fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week-of-year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Day-of-week fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean (std. dev.) dep. var. 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.12) 1.40 (2.58)
Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136
Notes: This table presents intent-to-treat and IV estimates of the effects of the ritual on perceptions, theft
expectations, actual theft, and perceived stress for the sample of non-believing beer sellers. The unit of
observation is beer seller by day. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is an indicator variable equal
to one if beer seller feels protected from theft; in columns 3 and 4, it is an indicator variable equal to
one if beer seller expects a theft incidence in the following week; in columns 5 and 6, it is an indicator
variable equal to one if retailer experienced a theft incidence during the day; and in columns 7 and 8, it
is self-reported stress level. All regressions include beer seller fixed effects. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 add
day-of-week and week-of-year fixed effects. For each regression, intent-to-treat coefficients, beta coefficients
of the ITT, IV coefficients, and p-values for no effect (in italics) are reported. p-values are computed using
randomization inference with 10,000 reassignments of treatment status. All regressions are weighted by
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